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Neither the academic literature nor the tort reform lobby has observed a 
deep irony in the American law of enterprise liability. The intellectual roots 
of enterprise liability lie in a late nineteenth-century movement o reengineer 
the workplace, a movement whose best known exponent was scientific man- 
ager Frederick Winslow Taylor. Along with a generation of managerial engi- 
neers, Taylor popularized broad ideas about managerial responsibility for the 
operations of enterprise-ideas that when loosed on the decentralized institu- 
tions of American tort law ultimately found one of their strongest expressions 
in the law of enterprise liability. Enterprise liability thus stands as one of the 
great twentieth-century examples of the unanticipated consequences of social 
action. 
This Article is a modest study in what sociologist Robert Merton fa- 
mously labeled "the unanticipated consequences of purposive social ac- 
tion."' Half a century ago, scholarship relating to this phenomenon was 
closely associated with intellectual skepticism of the totalizing aspirations 
of twentieth-century bureaucratic nation-states.2 The common theme in 
the unanticipated consequences literature was the notion that the inter- 
actions of millions of individuals in a modern society were simply too 
complex to model for purposes of centralized social planning. Classic 
examples thus included (in sociology) the unanticipated results of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, whose commitment to working through local 
organizations seemingly hindered its pioneering conservation efforts,3 or 
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1. Robert Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 
Am. Soc. Rev. 894, 894 (1936). 
2. For examples of this skeptical approach, see Karl Popper, The Poverty of 
Historicism 89-91 (Harper & Row 1964) (1957); 1 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and 
Liberty: Rules and Order 11-15 (1973). 
3. See Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal 
Organization 209-10, 257 (1949). For a recent account with similar themes, see generally 
James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (1997). 
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(in economics) rent control legislation that was said to harm the very 
people it was intended to assist.4 In each of these cases, and in many 
more, a dizzying array of social interactions made central planning an 
apparently quixotic, even foolhardy project.5 Attempts by the state to 
reengineer social life, in short, inevitably tripped over what Milton Fried- 
man (apparently following professor-turned-congressman Dick Armey) 
called government's "invisible foot."6 
This article inverts the state-to-society trajectory typical of the heyday 
of unanticipated consequences studies. The mid-twentieth-century unan- 
ticipated consequences literature focused on the complex and unpredict- 
able effects of state action in civil society. I am interested instead in the 
unforeseen consequences of rationalized planning in civil society-and 
in particular in the nature of the firm-when filtered through the sheer 
complexity of the decentralized institutions that make up the American 
legal system. More specifically, my aim is to focus on late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century scientific management of the firm, which was 
among the United States's leading contributions to twentieth-century to- 
talizing institutions.7 I want to suggest that the rise of scientific manage- 
ment is linked to a later development familiar to today's tort lawyers, and 
bitterly opposed by the managers who carry on Frederick Winslow Tay- 
lor's legacy: the emergence and expansion of"enterprise liability" during 
the second half of the twentieth century. 
By "enterprise liability," I mean the theory that business enterprises 
should pay for injuries they cause because they are in the best position to 
avoid causing such injuries, and because they are better able to spread 
the costs associated with them. Scholars disagree, to be sure, over the 
precise contours of the rise of enterprise liability.8 Moreover, it seems 
4. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 167-72 (lst ed. 1972); see also 
Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 282-83 (1997) (listing rent control and 
an array of other regulatory measures that are said to have self-defeating consequences). 
5. See Richard Vernon, Unintended Consequences, 7 Pol. Theory 57, 57 (1979); 
Richard M. Weiss, Weber on Bureaucracy: Management Consultant or Political Theorist?, 
8 Acad. of Mgmt. Rev. 242, 243 (1983). 
6. David Maraniss, Armey Arsenal: Plain Talk and Dramatic Tales, Wash. Post, Feb. 
21, 1995, at Al; Steven M. Gillon, "That's Not What We Meant to Do": Reform and Its 
Unintended Consequences in Twentieth-Century America 26 (2000). The story has it that 
Armey, then a professor at North Texas State University, won a contest held by Friedman 
in the latter's Newsweek column for the best phrase to describe the harms caused by 
government intervention. 
7. The penitentiary was among the United States's leading nineteenth-century 
rationalizing institutions; its subsequent morbid progress places it among the U.S.'s 
leading contributions in the twentieth century as well. See David J. Rothman, Behavior 
Modification in Total Institutions, in American Law and the Constitutional Order 293, 293 
(Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber-eds., enlarged ed. 1988) (1978). 
8. Some argue that the rise of enterprise liability represented a shift toward absolute 
or strict liability. E.g., Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale LJ. 1055, 1056-61 (1972); John G. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in 
Modern Tort Law, 53 Va. L. Rev. 815, 837-40 (1967); Charles O. Gregory, Trespass to 
Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359, 382-97 (1951); George L. Priest, Can 
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clear that the enterprise liability "revolution" has stopped short of the 
successes once envisioned for it. Yet virtually everyone agrees that tort 
liability expanded dramatically after 1960 in fields such as products liabil- 
ity, medical malpractice, and landowner and occupier liability.9 This ex- 
pansion of liability has made enterprise liability among the most signifi- 
cant developments in tort doctrine over the past half century. 
The central ideas of enterprise liability found their first significant 
expression not in the decisions of mid-century torts judges, nor in the 
programs of Progressive Era reformers (let alone in the advocacy of the 
plaintiffs' bar), but rather in the efforts of late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century engineers to remake the firm. The postmodern view of 
the firm sees it not as a hierarchical planned institution but as a nexus of 
contracts, a kind of horizontal marketplace in which labor and capital 
come together for productive ends.10 But it is no coincidence that this 
current interpretation of the firm vies with an older, high-modernist con- 
ception of the firm as a hierarchical, authoritarian alternative to con- 
tracting in the market."l The older tradition found its pure type in the 
idea of scientific management, a notion that was exceptionally vigorous in 
the United States, and indeed has long been identified as an American 
phenomenon. As formulated by early managerial engineers such as Tay- 
lor, scientific management's basic aim was to establish breathtaking new 
powers over the management of the firm, and indeed over workers them- 
selves, and to persuade employees and the public that managers were 
properly responsible for even the most minute details of the production 
process. 
Absolute Manufacturer Liability Be Defended?, 9 Yale J. Reg. 237, 253-54 (1992) 
[hereinafter Priest, Absolute Manufacturer Liability]; George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law 
and Its Reform, 22 Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 7, 10 (1987). Other appraisals contend that the 
transformation of tort law stopped short of becoming a regime of strict liability, but 
eliminated many of the doctrinal obstacles to plaintiff recovery from negligent defendants. 
See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability 
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1263, 1329-30 
(1991); Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 Md. L. 
Rev. 1190, 1208-09 (1996); Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns 
of Sociolegal Change, 23 Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1988) [hereinafter Rabin, Tort Law in 
Transition]; Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern 
American Tort Law, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 601, 605-09 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartz, Beginning 
and Possible End]; Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict 
Liability, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 963, 968 (1981). 
9. See Peter H. Schuck, The New Judicial Ideology of Tort Law, in New Directions in 
Liability Law 4, 4-5 (Walter Olson ed., 1988). The expansion of tort liability slowed and 
perhaps even reversed itself in the 1980s. See Theodore Eisenberg &James A. Henderson, 
Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 731, 741-44 (1992); 
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products 
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479, 488-98 (1990). 
10. Michael L. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 310-12 (1976). 
11. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 386, 388 (1937). 
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Most significant for my interests here, Taylorism's beginnings were 
closely bound up in efforts to systematize the way in which firms dealt 
with industrial accidents. Beginning in the 1880s, a number of sophisti- 
cated firms established accident insurance benefit programs for their em- 
ployees. In the same years, an early generation of managerial engineers 
developed new ideas about reengineering workplace safety. By the early 
decades of the twentieth century, these developments in firms' treatment 
of industrial accidents had achieved some remarkable successes. After 
1910, workmen's compensation statutes (as they were known in gender- 
specific terms12) formalized the accident insurance benefits with which 
certain leading firms had experimented in the preceding decades. And 
in the second and third decades of the twentieth century, many American 
employers implemented earlier engineers' pioneering ideas about safety 
in the workplace. Yet the largely successful campaign to remake the na- 
ture of work and to expand the scope of managerial prerogatives in the 
American economy gave rise (or so I shall argue here) to a conception of 
enterprise responsibility-also exceptionally vigorous in the United 
States-that turned out to be far broader than any of scientific manage- 
ment's early twentieth-century proponents had anticipated. Once loosed, 
the rationalizing ideas underlying scientific management took on a life of 
their own in the labyrinthine, highly decentralized, and nonrationalized 
structures of American tort law. 
I should clarify that this article is not a study of the possible unantici- 
pated consequences of enterprise liability itself.13 Nor is it a study of the 
wide array of unanticipated consequences that followed from the systemic 
planning aspirations of Taylorite engineers. Taylorism produced unin- 
tended results such as bitter strikes by resistant workers,14 as well as re- 
sults both unintended and unanticipated, such as Louis Brandeis's well- 
known appropriation of scientific management theories in 1911 to op- 
pose proposed railroad rate increases.15 This article singles out a particu- 
lar unanticipated consequence (or set of unanticipated consequences) 
from among many arising out of the transformation of labor manage- 
ment in the early twentieth-century firm. In the resonances between sci- 
entific management and enterprise liability lie some interesting lessons 
12. I argue elsewhere that the gender specificity of the workmen's compensation 
statutes is important in understanding a movement aimed in large part at supporting the 
family wage structure of male wage earners and dependent wives and children. See John 
Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic (forthcoming fall 2003) (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) [hereinafter Witt, Accidental Republic]. 
13. For such studies, see Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product 
Liability Law, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 2193, 2213-20 (1989); George L. Priest, The Current 
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale LJ. 1521, 1585-86 (1987) [hereinafter 
Priest, Current Insurance Crisis]. 
14. See Hugh GJ. Aitken, Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal: Scientific Management in 
Action, 1908-1915, at 5-10 (1960). 
15. See Louis D. Brandeis, Scientific Management and Railroads, Being Part of a Brief 
Submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission 91-92 (1911). 
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for lawyers and historians-lessons about the origins of one of the great 
legal transformations of our time, and lessons about the dialectic of resis- 
tance and accommodation that characterizes the response of many of our 
far-flung legal institutions to systemic efforts to rationalize social 
institutions. 
In what follows, Part I describes the managerial engineering move- 
ment that began in the United States in the 1880s. Part II turns to the 
encounter of managerial engineers with the turn-of-the-century American 
industrial accident crisis. Part III focuses on one strand of that encoun- 
ter, namely the accident insurance benefit programs that certain sophisti- 
cated employers instituted for their employees. Part IV then details the 
first generation of managerial engineering efforts to improve American 
workplace safety, out of which arose a novel theory of managerial causa- 
tion in work injuries. Part V traces ideas pioneered in scientific manage- 
ment-including what may have been the first use of the term "enterprise 
liability"-into the mid-twentieth-century liability explosion. 
I. 
Forerunners to scientific management arose out of a late nineteenth- 
century crisis of confidence in competition and markets. The political 
economy ofJacksonian America had replaced entrenched monopoly with 
markets as the leading mechanism for economic development; equal 
rights for all market actors replaced special incentives for a few as the 
dominant approach to economic development.16 In the North, this shift 
was especially pronounced in the field of labor, where the incentives of a 
system of contracting came to be thought by many as superior in effi- 
ciency terms to coercion. Markets in free labor put the "silent compul- 
sion of economic relations," to use Marx's phrase, to work in the extrac- 
tion of labor power from the worker.17 In Marx's critical account, the 
market mechanism for labor control "surpasse[d] all earlier systems of 
production, which were based on directly compulsory labour, in its en- 
ergy and its quality of unbounded and ruthless activity."18 And indeed, 
many early advocates of free labor were remarkably frank about their reli- 
ance on the motivating force of hunger and poverty to spur on a labor 
force.19 But in more affirmative accounts that began to emerge as early 
as the late eighteenth century and culminated in the United States in the 
decade leading up to the Civil War, free labor was the key to the progres- 
sive development of human societies away from anachronistic regimes of 
feudal authority, status hierarchies, and slavery. From Adam Smith to 
16. See Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of 
Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence 33-45 (1993); Stanley I. Kutler, Privilege and 
Creative Destruction: The Charles River Bridge Case 15-17, 51-53 (1971). 
17. 1 Karl Marx, Capital 899 (Ben Fowkes trans., Penguin 1976) (1867). 
18. Id. at 425. 
19. For examples, see David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of 
Revolution: 1770-1823, at 358-59 (1975). 
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Benjamin Franklin to William Lloyd Garrison, leading thinkers in the An- 
glo American tradition viewed the incentives provided by free labor as 
vastly more efficient than the compulsions and coercions of unfree labor 
alternatives.20 
By the 1880s, however, observers of the American economy had be- 
gun to question the efficiency of competitive markets in the spheres of 
both exchange and production. Competition among firms seemed to be 
causing harmful price cutting and overproduction. Railroads found 
themselves having built hundreds, even thousands of miles of duplicative 
track in competition with one another.21 Shippers in St. Louis and At- 
lanta, for example, as Gabriel Kolko pointed out in his controversial 1965 
book on railroad regulation, "had the option of twenty competitive routes 
between the two cities."22 Charles Francis Adams, president of the Union 
Pacific Railroad and former chairman of the Massachusetts Board of Rail- 
road Commissioners, argued that "unhealthy railroad competition" and 
the "present competitive chaos" needed to give way to "some healthy con- 
trol" or an "orderly, confederated whole."23 Similarly, in steel and iron 
production and in the Pennsylvania anthracite coal fields, wasteful over- 
production by newly mechanized firms with unprecedented production 
capacities forced industry-wide price cutting and appeared to be driving 
firms to the brink of bankruptcy.24 "As prices fall and profits shrink," 
observed economist David Ames Wells in 1889, competitors engaged in 
ever-downward cycles of further price slashing in order to retain markets 
and customers "until gradually the industrial system becomes depressed 
20. See 3 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations 365 (Edwin Cannan ed., The Modern Library 1937) (1776); Benjamin Franklin, 
Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, 1751, in 4 The Papers of Benjamin 
Franklin 225, 229-30 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1961); Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to 
Contract 21 (1998) (quoting Garrison); David Brion Davis, Slavery and Human Progress 
113 (1984) [hereinafter Davis, Slavery and Human Progress]. 
21. See Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation 38-40, 60-61 (1984); Gabriel 
Kolko, Railroads and Regulation 1877-1916, at 7-29 (1965) [hereinafter Kolko, Railroads 
and Regulation]; Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of 
American History, 1900-1916, at 26-56 (1963) [hereinafter Kolko, Triumph of 
Conservatism]. 
22. Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, supra note 21, at 7. 
23. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Railroads: Their Origin and Problems 186-90 (New 
York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1878). 
24. See Kolko, Triumph of Conservatism, supra note 21, at 30-39; Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895-1904, at 14-86 
(1985); Charles M. Schwab, Competition-Its Uses and Abuses, 1912 Year Book of the 
American Iron and Steel Institute, 47, 47-48 (1912) [hereinafter Iron & Steel Institute] 
("We must avoid destructive competition."); MartinJ. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction 
of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics 55-57 (1988); T.S. 
Bentley, Neglected Factors in Machine-Shop Economics, 22 Eng'g Mag. 514, 514 (1902) 
(excoriating "rapid increase in the pressure of competition" in machine production). 
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and demoralized, and the weaker succumb (fail), with a greater or less 
destruction of capital and waste of product."25 
Yet in important respects, market mechanisms reached into mid- 
nineteenth-century firms. Many mid-nineteenth-century firms adopted 
management practices that relied on the preservation of a skilled 
workforce.26 Such firms did not engage in the de-skilling and hierarchi- 
cal rule making that characterized industrial work in places such as the 
New England textile mills. At the Baldwin Locomotive Works in Philadel- 
phia, for example, management espoused a producerist ethic that linked 
managers and workers together in a roughly, though of course not 
wholly, egalitarian partnership in the skilled work of producing custom- 
built railroad locomotives.27 Nearby textile mills in Philadelphia adopted 
a similar strategy of reliance on skilled operatives in whom the mills 
vested significant discretion.28 Moreover, even as some employers sought 
to impose new forms of discipline in the industrial workplace, many work- 
ers actively resisted their attempts and were often able to retain consider- 
able discretion in the direction of their own labor. Practices such as the 
inside contract system, under which manufacturers contracted with 
skilled workers inside the firm on a task basis, permitted skilled workers 
to take charge of particular production projects.29 In iron rolling mills, 
for example, workers collectively contracted with their employer on only 
a tonnage rate and controlled among themselves the division of labor 
and the allocation of pay.30 For other skilled craftsmen such as coal min- 
ers, steel workers, and machinists, specialized skills and knowledge often 
25. David A. Wells, Recent Economic Changes and Their Effect on the Production 
and Distribution of Wealth and the Well-Being of Society 80 (1889). 
26. See Charles Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: 
Politics, Markets and Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization, Past & Present 
No. 108, Aug. 1985, at 133, 150-56; Philip Scranton, Proprietary Capitalism: The Textile 
Manufacture at Philadelphia, 1800-1885, at 314-52 (1983). 
27. See John K. Brown, The Baldwin Locomotive Works, 1831-1915, at 95 (1995); 
Walter Licht, Studying Work: Personnel Policies in Philadelphia Firms, 1850-1950, in 
Masters to Managers 43, 65-66 (Sanford M. Jacoby ed., 1991) [hereinafter Licht, Studying 
Work]. 
28. Philip Scranton, "Have a Heart for the Manufacturers!": Production, Distribution, 
and the Decline of American Textile Manufacturing, in World of Possibilities: Flexibility 
and Mass Production in Western Industrialization 310, 313 (Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan 
Zeitlin eds., 1997). 
29. See Brown, supra note 27, at 115-19; Dan Clawson, Bureaucracy and the Labor 
Process: The Transformation of U.S. Industry, 1860-1920, at 71-125 (1980); Walter Licht, 
Industrializing America 129 (1995); Daniel Nelson, Managers and Workers: Origins of the 
New Factory System in the United States, 1880-1920, at 36-37 (1975) [hereinafter Nelson, 
Managers and Workers]; John Buttrick, The Inside Contract System, 12 J. Econ. Hist. 205 
passim (1952); Ernest J. Englander, The Inside Contract System of Production and 
Organization: A Neglected Aspect of the History of the Firm, 28 Lab. Hist. 429 passim 
(1987). 
30. David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, 
and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925, at 9-21 (1987) [hereinafter Montgomery, Fall 
of the House of Labor]. 
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made it possible to remain relatively self-directing in the details of indus- 
trial work processes.31 Thus, late into the nineteenth century, skilled 
workers were able to make and implement union work rules to maintain 
a modicum of autonomy in the production process.32 Even among un- 
skilled workers, piece-work payment systems (though often exploitative in 
their own way) had the similar effect of contracting particular labor ar- 
rangements out of the hierarchical master-servant relation.33 
Many observers began to rethink the value of free labor in the em- 
ployment relation, as well. It bears noting here that the "freedom" of the 
free labor employment relation has always been ambiguous.34 Mid-nine- 
teenth-century approaches to labor management, for example, presented 
a curious mix of market mechanisms and employer-employee hierarchy. 
Business historians have labeled mid-nineteenth-century workshops and 
factories the "foreman's empire."35 Although there was considerable va- 
riation among industries, foremen-usually skilled workers with little for- 
mal training who had risen through the ranks-generally utilized the 
"driving" method of labor management, a method that combined "au- 
thoritarian rule and physical compulsion."36 Foremen "pushe[d] the 
gang" of workers using an array of gestures and profanity known as "Roll- 
ing-mill English" to get the work done.37 At the same time, the emerging 
law of employment contracts made employees' subjection to their em- 
ployers' control the core feature of the employment relation.38 
In those firms that sought to replace worker discretion with com- 
mand-and-control hierarchies, employer control of the production pro- 
cess was often crude and imprecise by twentieth-century standards.39 
Foremen dominated the shop floor, with little accountability and few 
standards of conduct to guide the exercise of their authority.40 Ineffec- 
31. See David Brody, Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the Twentieth Century 
Struggle 3-4 (1980); David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America: Studies in the 
History of Work, Technology, and Labor Struggles 4-7, 9-27 (1979) [hereinafter 
Montgomery, Workers' Control in America]; James Whiteside, Regulating Danger: The 
Struggle for Mine Safety in the Rocky Mountain Coal Industry 43-44 (1990). 
32. Montgomery, Workers' Control in America, supra note 31, at 15-18. 
33. Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the 
United States 55 (1982). 
34. See Robert J. Steinfeld, Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor in the Nineteenth 
Century 8 (2001). 
35. Nelson, Managers and Workers, supra note 29, at 34-54. 
36. Id. at 43. 
37. Id. 
38. See Karen Orren, Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development 
in the United States 68-117 (1991); Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in 
the Early American Republic 284-92 (1993); Arthur F. McEvoy, Freedom of Contract, 
Labor, and the Administrative State, in The State and Freedom of Contract 198, 209-10 
(Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998). 
39. See Sanford M. Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the 
Transformation of Work in American Industry, 1900-1945, at 13-37 (1985) [hereinafter 
Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy]. 
40. See Nelson, Managers and Workers, supra note 29, at 34-54. 
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tive cost accounting mechanisms obscured the relative costs and merits of 
various approaches to employee management.41 And while the often ar- 
bitrary power of the foreman system was antithetical to the culture of 
skilled industrial craftsmen, the foreman system of labor management 
was frequently ineffective and sloppy.42 As a matter of practice, then, 
workers frequently retained considerable discretion over work processes. 
The crisis of confidence in markets of the 1880s, however, called into 
question this mix of market mechanisms and often haphazard employer 
control. To be sure, there had been earlier challenges to the idea that 
free labor was efficient labor. The experience of emancipation in Ja- 
maica after 1838, for example, seemed to many English and American 
entrepreneurs to cast into doubt whether former slaves would work for 
wages as productively as they had worked under the compulsion of slav- 
ery.43 Reconstruction in the United States seemed to hold a similar les- 
son for many northern whites who sought to take over southern planta- 
tions after the Civil War.44 But with the great railroad strikes of 1877, the 
nationwide strikes inspired by the Knights of Labor in 1886, and the 
Homestead strike of 1892 (which featured the famous pitched battle be- 
tween steel workers and Pinkerton detectives hired by Henry Clay Frick), 
employment relations came to appear especially susceptible to the waste 
and friction that many had begun to identify in competitive markets 
more generally.45 Relations between labor and management, on this 
view, presented another example of the ways in which markets led to inef- 
ficient and wasteful systems of production. The "foreman's empire,"46 it 
seemed, lacked the systematic precision that modern conditions ap- 
peared to require. 
Influential leaders in American business responded to the late nine- 
teenth-century crises of overcompetition and labor conflict by moving to 
replace markets with hierarchies. Some of the nation's leading firms 
sought to establish a new corporatist political economy that would elimi- 
nate ruinous competition and reduce labor-management conflict by re- 
moving both of these aspects of economic life from the market. Firms in 
41. See Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy, supra note 39, at 43; Nelson, Managers and 
Workers, supra note 29, at 50. 
42. See Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy, supra note 39, at 14-15; Nelson, Managers 
and Workers, supra note 29, at 42-48. 
43. See Thomas C. Holt, The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in 
Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938, at 42-53 (1992); Davis, Slavery and Human Progress, 
supra note 20, at 220. 
44. See, e.g., Gerald David Jaynes, Branches Without Roots: Genesis of the Black 
Working Class in the American South, 1862-1882, at 13 (1986). 
45. See Philip S. Foner, The Great Labor Uprising of 1877 passim (1977); 
Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor, supra note 30, at 129; Nell Irvin Painter, 
Standing at Armageddon: The United States 1877-1919, at 110-14, 370 (1987); Heather 
Cox Richardson, The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, and Politics in the Post-Civil 
War North, 1865-1901, at xiii-xiv, 211 (2001); Kenneth Warren, Triumphant Capitalism: 
Henry Clay Frick and the Industrial Transformation of America 84-97 (1996). 
46. Nelson, Managers and Workers, supra note 29, at 34-54. 
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industries such as steel sought repeatedly, but with little success, to form 
"gentlemen's agreements and pools ... in an effort to control ... produc- 
tion."47 When enforcement problems caused most such initiatives to col- 
lapse,48 American industrialists turned to the business trust and the cor- 
porate merger to police against comnpetitive pressures.49 Large scale 
enterprise, argued industrialists such as S.C.T. Dodd of Standard Oil, 
James Hill of the Great Northern Railway, and Charles Schwab of U.S. 
Steel, offered the benefit of substantial economies of scale.50 Moreover, 
men such as Charles Francis Adams of the Union Pacific Railroad argued 
in the 1880s that the advancement of civilization led inevitably toward big 
business. "[T]he principle of consolidation ... is a necessity-a natural 
law of growth," Adams argued; "[y]ou may not like it: you will have to 
reconcile yourselves to it."51 In the "modern world" business necessarily 
"does its work through vast aggregations of men and capital.... This is a 
sort of latter-day manifest destiny."52 
A second strand of the hierarchical reorganization of economic pro- 
duction focused not on cooperation and consolidation among firms, but 
rather on the reorganization of production within the firm. American 
labor management practices in the mid-nineteenth century had given lit- 
tle indication of the strength of the managerial movement that was to 
come. Into the middle of the nineteenth century, American enterprise 
exhibited little systematic organization of the production process. So 
long as the scale of production remained relatively small, Alfred Chan- 
dler has argued, there was little call for systemic attention to the rational 
organization of the workplace itself.53 And yet by the turn of the twenti- 
eth century, American firms laid claim to managerial control of the pro- 
duction process with a vigor unmatched in Western economies.54 In 
Chandler's magisterial interpretation, the coming of the railroad brought 
with it new opportunities for rational managerial approaches to running 
47. Walter Adams, The Steel Industry, in The Structure of American Industry: Some 
Case Studies 145, 147 (Walter Adams ed., 1950). 
48. Id. at 147-48; Lamoreaux, supra note 24, at 14-16. 
49. See Adams, supra note 47, at 148-49; Lamoreaux, supra note 24, at 1-2; McCraw, 
supra note 21, at 48-49; Warren, supra note 45, at 118-40; James Weinstein, The 
Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918, at 63 (1968). 
50. See Kolko, Triumph of Conservatism, supra note 21, at 12-13. 
51. Id. at 14. 
52. Id. 
53. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in 
American Business 14 (1977). 
54. See Sanford M. Jacoby, Modern Manors: Welfare Capitalism Since the New Deal 
12-13 (1997); Sanford M. Jacoby, American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Importance of 
Management, in Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on 
American Employers 173, 173-200 (Sanford M. Jacoby ed., 1991); Joel Rogers, In the 
Shadow of the Law: Institutional Aspects of Postwar U.S. Union Decline, in Labor Law in 
America: Historical and Critical Essays 283, 287 (Christopher L. Tomlins & AndrewJ. King 
eds., 1992). 
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business enterprises.55 Railroads themselves posed significant challenges 
of organization, management, and coordination. Time zones had to be 
standardized so as to establish consistent and reliable scheduling, track 
gauges had to be integrated and standardized, bridges and overpasses 
had to be built according to industry standards for car sizes and weights, 
large and widely dispersed workforces had to be managed, and goods in 
transit had to be coordinated with schedules and railroad cars.56 Moreo- 
ver, the railroads created for the first time the possibility of taking advan- 
tage of economies of scale in mass production. Before the railroad, raw 
material could not be amassed in sufficient quantities, and finished goods 
could not be shipped quickly enough, to support mass expansion of the 
production process. But with railroad shipping bringing new speed and 
capacity to the movement of materials and goods, firms were suddenly 
able to expand production dramatically. And with expansion came a new 
need for, as well as new economies of scale to facilitate, the rationaliza- 
tion of the production process to coordinate materials, labor, and distri- 
bution.57 By the early 1880s, a new generation of managerial engineers 
began to advocate administered, hierarchical, and rationalized modes of 
labor management.58 Railroad managers established professional and 
semiprofessional associations such as the American Society for Railroad 
Superintendents and the Society of Railroad Comptrollers, Accountants 
and Auditors.59 Mechanical engineers formed the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) in 1880, which was followed quickly by the 
establishment of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers in 1884.60 
Newjournals and magazines designed for engineers and railroad officials 
such as Engineer and Surveyor (1874), Engineering News (1875), Engineering 
Magazine (1890), and Cassier's Magazine (1891) facilitated the dissemina- 
tion and rationalization of professional knowledge. 
By the turn of the century, managers in steel production turned with 
new interest to the rationalization of labor management.61 Leading man- 
agement engineer O.M. Becker argued that under modern production 
methods "human machinery" was the "most important part" of the firm, 
and indeed accounted for a substantial portion of most firms' variable 
costs.62 The foreman system and the crude approach to production with 
55. See Chandler, supra note 53, at 107. 
56. Id. at 122-33; C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South 1877-1913, at 
123-24 (1951). 
57. See Chandler, supra note 53, at 207-84. 
58. See Nelson, Managers and Workers, supra note 29, at 48-54. 
59. Chandler, supra note 53, at 130-131. 
60. See David F. Noble, America By Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of 
Corporate Capitalism 36 (1977). 
61. See Brody, supra note 31, at 28. 
62. O.M. Becker, The Square Deal in Works Management (pt. 1), 30 Eng'g Mag. 536, 
542 (1906). For another example, see William B. Dickson, Betterment of Labor 
Conditions in the Steel Industry, in 1910 Proceedings of the American Iron and Steel 
Institute 56, 56 (1910). 
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which it was associated, however, were wholly unable to cope with the 
complex new demands of labor management in the age of large scale 
mechanization.63 A rational and "scientific" approach to labor manage- 
ment, on the other hand, promised to provide new ways to accommodate 
workers to managerial incursions on traditionally worker-controlled as- 
pects of the production process.64 Organizations such as the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers thus began to emphasize labor manage- 
ment questions rather than mechanical or purely engineering matters.65 
The new problem in the organization of production, it seemed, was the 
adoption of "new shop methods" as "a corollary of modern machinery."66 
As engineer John Patterson put it in 1900, "the problems of to-day in 
factory management are not so much problems of machinery as of men; 
not so much of organization as of personal relations."67 
Frederick Winslow Taylor stood at the forefront of the movement to 
rationalize the American workplace.68 Born in 1856 to a wealthy Phila- 
delphia Quaker family, Taylor became a journeyman machinist after a 
mysterious (and apparently stress related) eye ailment ended his prepara- 
tions for the Harvard College entrance exam. Within a few short years he 
had become a foreman at the important Philadelphia steel company, 
Midvale Steel, and a close advisor to its owner. In 1885, he joined the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers.69 
The Quaker community in which Taylor grew up had played an im- 
portant role in developing and popularizing the ideas underlying the 
ideal of free labor. The "Quaker ethic," as David Brion Davis has called it, 
held that God resided in the soul of every individual.70 It followed for 
Quakers that the compulsion and forcible hierarchies of Southern slavery 
were anathema, and in the years around Taylor's birth, antebellum 
63. Becker, supra note 62, at 542. 
64. See Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy, supra note 39, at 99-100. 
65. See, e.g., The Premium Plan for Paying Labor, 26 Eng'g News 63, 63 (1891) 
(reporting on meeting of AMSE at which "the paper which elicited the longest and hottest 
discussion" was about wages, rather than a technical engineering issue). 
66. New Shop Methods a Corollary of Modern Machinery, 19 Eng'g Mag. 369, 369 
(1900); see also The Maintenance of Machine Shop Personnel, 25 Eng'g Mag. 750, 750 
(1903) (arguing that the modern era of machine shops under the "maximum 
development of mechanical . . . function" required a new system of personnel 
management); The Promotion of Industrial Efficiency and National Prosperity, 25 Eng'g 
Mag. 329, 329 (1903) (reporting on speech byJohn B.C. Kershaw, arguing that now that 
engineers had made machines more efficient, the next step in industrial organization was 
to "increase the capacity of the worker and make him willing to use it to the utmost"). 
67. John H. Patterson, Altruism and Sympathy as Factors in Works Administration, 20 
Eng'g Mag. 577, 577 (1901). 
68. The best book on the relationship between Taylor and the management 
engineering movement generally is Daniel Nelson, Frederick W. Taylor and the Rise of 
Scientific Management (1980). 
69. See Robert Kanigel, The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the 
Enigma of Efficiency 233-34 (1997). 
70. See David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture 291-332 
(1966). 
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Quakers had played an important role in galvanizing Northern support 
for antislavery ideas.71 Taylor, however, had little use for Quaker notions 
of human perfectibility or for the consensual approach to social relations 
that followed from such notions.72 In his view, the free labor system of 
the postwar years, which relied on "initiative and incentive" to induce 
labor, had led to systematic shirking-"soldiering," he called it-by ob- 
structionist workers.73 
In Taylor's view, labor markets that relied on initiative and incentive 
were hopelessly wasteful. In combination with clumsy, ill-trained fore- 
men, incentive based systems of labor management necessarily meant 
that "each workman shall be left with the final responsibility for doing his 
job practically as he thinks best, with comparatively little help and advice 
from the management."74 As a result, instead of a standard practice for a 
given step in the production process, there were "fifty or a hundred dif- 
ferent ways of doing each element of the work," ways that had been 
"handed down from man to man by word of mouth."75 "[T]here was," 
however, "but a remote chance" in such a system "that [any one worker] 
should hit upon the one best method of doing each piece of work out of 
the hundreds of possible methods which lay before him."76 Theodore 
Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot had begun to teach the nation to recog- 
nize waste in the exploitation of natural resources such as forests, water, 
topsoil, and minerals.77 "But our larger wastes of human effort," Taylor 
complained, "which go on every day through such of our acts as are blun- 
dering, ill-directed, or inefficient ... are less visible, less tangible, and are 
but vaguely appreciated."78 
The answer was to reengineer work and to put into place precisely 
calibrated methods for even the most routine tasks in the production pro- 
cess. Scientific reorganization of the processes of work would allow man- 
agement to "substitut[e] . . . science for the individual judgment of the 
workman."79 Through time and motion study, managers could determine 
by ostensibly scientific methods the "one best method"80 to carry out even 
the simplest of tasks, and then require minute compliance with pre- 
scribed methods by workers.81 
71. Id. 
72. Cf. R. Keith Aufhauser, Slavery and Scientific Management, 33 J. Econ. Hist. 811, 
823 (1973) ("[T]he master-slave relationship is quite similar to the capitalist-wage-labor 
relationship in scientifically managed enterprises."). 
73. Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, in Scientific 
Management 1, 19-21, 34 (1947) [hereinafter Scientific Management] (works in 
collection separately paginated). 
74. Id. at 25. 
75. Id. at 31-32. 
76. Id. at 112. 
77. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
78. Id. at 5. 
79. Id. at 114. 
80. Id. at 112. 
81. Testifying before a congressional committee in 1912, Taylor claimed: 
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Most important for our purposes is an often overlooked facet of Tay- 
lor's project. In advocating the importance of managerial control, Taylor 
also announced a new principle of managerial responsibility. Firms 
could be, and indeed, properly ought to be responsible for managing 
wide swaths of American social life. "[I]n its essence," Taylor explained 
to a congressional committee in 1912, "scientific management involves a 
complete mental revolution ...."82 To be sure, workers needed to re- 
think "their duties toward their work, toward their fellow men, and to- 
ward their employers."83 But scientific management also involved 
[an] equally complete mental revolution on the part of those on 
the management's side-the foreman, the superintendent, the 
owner of the business, the board of directors-a complete 
mental revolution on their part as to their duties toward their 
fellow workers in the management, toward their workmen, and 
toward all of their daily problems.84 
Worker discipline, in Taylor's view, went hand in hand with managerial 
responsibility. 
In the case of work accidents, for example, Taylor favored employer- 
provided accident insurance benefits, financed through fines paid by the 
workers for disciplinary infractions.85 By 1900, Taylor's Midvale Steel had 
set up precisely such an accident insurance plan. Employees contributed 
five cents per week to the insurance fund in return for injury and death 
benefits.86 And therein lay the seeds of a transformation in the ways in 
which American firms handled industrial injuries. 
II. 
Taylor was hardly the only manager seeking to design new ways of 
dealing with workplace accidents. By the 1890s the industrial accident 
had come to symbolize the crises of wasteful competition and clumsy la- 
bor management that seemed to beset the economy more generally. I 
[I]n practically all of the mechanic arts the science which underlies each 
workman's act is so great and amounts to so much that the workman who is best 
suited to actually doing the work is incapable, either through lack of education or 
through insufficient mental capacity, of understanding this science. 
3 The Taylor and Other Systems of Shop Management: Hearings Before Special 
Committee of the House of Representatives to Investigate the Taylor and Other Systems of 
Shop Management Under Authority of H.R. 90, 62d Cong. 1416 (1912) (testimony of 
Fredrick Winslow Taylor), reprinted in Scientific Management, supra note 73, at 1, 89 
[hereinafter Taylor, Testimony (further citations to reprint)]. 
82. Id. at 27. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. See Frederick Winslow Taylor, Shop Management, in Scientific Management, 
supra note 73, at 1, 119-20, 198. 
86. Indus. Comm'n on the Relations and Conditions of Capital and Labor, 14 Report 
on the Relations of Capital and Labor Employed in Manufactures and General Business 
349, 352 (1901) (testimony of Charles J. Harrah, President of Midvale Steel Co., Dec. 22, 
1900). 
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have described the acute late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
American industrial accident problem elsewhere.87 Suffice it to say that 
the United States witnessed industrial accident rates far in excess of those 
in comparable developing economies in western Europe. Fatality rates in 
coal mining, as measured per employee, ranged between two and three 
times as high in the United States as in Great Britain between 1880 and 
1930.88 As measured by employee hour, railroad fatality rates were fifty 
percent higher in the United States than in Great Britain.89 Contempo- 
rary estimates of comparative accident rates were even more exaggerated, 
suggesting, for example, that accident rates among railroad employees in 
the United States were three and one-half times higher than in Great 
Britain for fatal injuries, and five times higher for nonfatal injuries.90 
The avalanche of industrial accidents in the United States was itself, 
at least in part, a result of mid-century ideals of free labor and worker 
discretion in the Northern states in which industrial development began. 
Left to their own devices, individual workers often underestimated the 
risks they faced.91 In many occupations, risk taking even became part of 
the ethic of manly workingmen's culture.92 In turn, the accidents for 
which free labor ideas were partly responsible came to pose dilemmas for 
each of several widely held interpretations of the significance of free la- 
bor. Liberals, who sought to distinguish the boundaries of individuals' 
respective spheres of free action, found it increasingly difficult to allocate 
responsibility (even for relatively common two-party accidents) to one 
party or the other.93 Labor organization members prized the much 
vaunted independence that mid-century free labor had promised. But 
industrial accidents seemed to reduce to dependency tens of thousands 
of families each year.94 
The school of free labor thought that held free markets in labor to 
be more efficient than mechanisms of hierarchical labor control was no 
exception to this pattern of disillusionment. The "industrial slaughter" of 
modern industry called further into doubt whether market mechanisms 
within the firm were indeed the most efficient way to organize labor. In 
response, the fledgling American engineering profession adopted acci- 
87. Witt, Accidental Republic, supra note 12, at ch. 2; John Fabian Witt, Toward a 
New History of American Accident Law, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 694-95, 717-21 (2001) 
[hereinafter Witt, American Accident Law]. 
88. Mark Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor, and Business in the Building of 
American Work Safety, 1870-1939, at 17, 23, 42 (1997). 
89. Id. 
90. Gilbert Lewis Campbell, Industrial Accidents and Their Compensation 16-17 
(1911). 
91. Henry R. Seager, Outline of a Program of Social Reform, in Labor and Other 
Economic Essays 79, 83 (Charles A. Gulick, Jr. ed., 1931) ("[E]ach individual thinks of 
himself as having a charmed life."). 
92. See Crystal Eastman, Work-Accidents and the Law 93-94 (1910). 
93. Witt, Accidental Republic, supra note 12, at ch. 2. 
94. Witt, American Accident Law, supra note 87, at 723-33; Witt, Accidental Republic, 
supra note 12, at ch. 3. 
2003] 15 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
dents and safety as central metaphors for what it saw as the excessive, 
unnecessary, and preventable waste pervading the national economy. 
It may be useful at this moment to step back and define more pre- 
cisely the engineers' conceptions of efficiency and waste. Modern econo- 
mists generally define efficiency as the allocation of resources to their 
highest value users. But turn-of-the-twentieth-century engineers had an 
altogether different conception of efficiency as an economy of inputs to 
outputs. On this view, engineers understood processes as efficient if they 
conserved resources, measured not in dollars but in sheer amount of nat- 
ural resources, raw materials, and muscle power required.95 Conversely, 
engineers viewed processes that exhausted excess resources as inefficient 
and wasteful. As one engineer put it in 1901, "the most conspicuous ten- 
dency of human activity is to get a maximum result by a minimum of 
expenditure. Minimum cost of fuel, of transportation, of brain and mus- 
cle, must hereafter be considered in the mighty competition that charac- 
terizes the commerce of the world."96 
The inputs to outputs conception of efficiency was quite common at 
the close of the nineteenth century and into the first decade of the twen- 
tieth. As historians since FrederickJackson Turner have recognized, the 
closing of the frontier generated a new sense of scarcity among many 
elites and middle-class Americans, a new sense that American resources- 
like those of European nations-might be bounded.97 This sense of lim- 
ited resources, in turn, gave rise to the new natural resources conserva- 
tionism to which Taylor compared his scientific management efforts.98 
In 1908, President Roosevelt created a National Conservation Commis- 
sion, which issued a report in 1909 on the condition of the nation's for- 
ests, waterways, lands, and mineral resources.99 A year later, Pinchot- 
who served as Roosevelt's Chief of the United States Bureau of Forestry 
and later as governor of Pennsylvania-published his influential book, 
The Fight for Conservation, in which he asked in Malthusian tones whether 
or not the current generation of Americans would, like its predecessors, 
95. On the engineering theory of efficiency, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the 
Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 591, 592-97 (1980). 
96. Leicester Allen, Economy of Heating and Ventilating the Machine Shop, 21 Eng'g 
Mag. 75, 80 (1901). 
97. See Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: "The Significance of the Frontier in 
American History" and Other Essays 183 (John Mack Faragher ed., 1994). 
98. See generally Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, 122-27 
(1959) (describing the relationship between natural resources conservationism and the 
engineering profession). For Taylor's comparison, see supra text accompanying note 78. 
99. See Executive Comm., Nat'l Conservation Comm'n, 1 Special Message from the 
President of the United States Transmitting a Report of the National Conservation 
Commission, with Accompanying Papers, S. Doc. No. 676, at 39-110 (Henry Gannett ed., 
2d Sess. 1909). 
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be able to conserve the nation's resources and "transmit them, still 
unexhausted, to our descendants?"'00 
Engineers turned to the problem of the waste in industrial accidents 
with the same spirit of conservation that Roosevelt and Pinchot brought 
to natural resources. Only a few years earlier, observed one electrical en- 
gineer, the United States had been a "young nation with vast natural re- 
sources.... [B]ut suddenly we find that our resources have been squan- 
dered and are approaching exhaustion."'10 In his view, the greatest waste 
was not in natural resources but rather in human resources. Inefficiency 
was responsible for the terrible "harvest of death, disaster and misery" 
embodied in the United States's disgraceful accident record.102 In the 
words of another engineer, the problem of "conserving the Nation's re- 
sources" was deeply bound up in "the prevention of accidents."'03 In- 
deed, even those who focused on natural resources such as water, forests, 
minerals, and lands saw in the accident problem a pressing problem of 
conservation. "[I]f the conservation of the natural resources is for man, it 
is an obvious suggestion that man himself should be conserved," observed 
Wisconsin conservationist Charles Richard Van Hise.104 By Van Hise's 
lights, "losses of life by accidents are appalling in this country," and "by 
proper precautionary measures ... the accidents may be reduced to one 
tenth their present number."105 
As early as the 1880s, American engineers began to focus on the pre- 
vention of accidents in industry as central to the project of rationalizing 
labor management,106 and by 1890, engineering trade journals devoted 
substantial coverage to the occurrence and prevention of railroad and 
other accidents.107 "[T]he life and health of every skilled workman," ar- 
gued the efficiency-minded engineers, "represent an asset that a factory 
100. Gifford Pinchot, The Fight for Conservation 3 (1910); see also Charles Richard 
Van Hise, The Conservation of Natural Resources in the United States 13-14 (1910) 
(surveying the conservation movement). 
101. Frank Koester, The Price of Inefficiency xiii (1913); see also Day Allen Willey, 
Mining Accidents, 39 Cassier's Mag. 232, 240 (1911) (urging that the benefits of increased 
attention to safety in mines "will be increasingly important as American resources become 
scarcer and less equal to the larger and larger demands of a growing nation and its 
expanding commerce"). 
102. Koester, supra note 101, at 46. 
103. H.H. Stock, First-Aid Movement in the Anthracite Region of Pennsylvania, 37 
Eng'g Mag. 321, 321 (1909). 
104. Van Hise, supra note 100, at 364. 
105. Id. at 369-70. 
106. See, e.g., S.W. Robinson, Railroad Economics, or Notes and Observations from 
the Ohio State Railway Inspection Service, 2 Transactions of the Am. Soc'y Mech. Eng'rs 
524, 524-25 (1881). 
107. See, for example, the tables of contents of the Engineering News for the period 
1874-1890. The 1874 opening issue (published as Engineer and Surveyor) included no 
reference to accidents as a subject for the journal. Only in 1877 and 1878 did the News 
include index entries for accidents-one in the New York Post Office, another arising out 
of the building of a caisson, and another on a railroad bridge. By 1890, however, 
recounting the details of accidents on railroads and railroad bridges had become a major 
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cannot afford to ignore."108 The "appalling mortality" suggested by rail- 
road and manufacturing accident statistics, however, threatened to un- 
dermine and even destroy the efficiency of the American railroad sys- 
tem.109 Much to the dismay of the engineering professionals, the United 
States, as one engineer put it, 
stand[s] first among all countries in the number of lives lost 
through accidents. In railroading, in mining, in manufacturing, 
and in general building operations, the number of accidents in 
the United States is annually greater in proportion to the popu- 
lation than in any of the civilised countries of the globe.110 
Others called the deaths in the United States from railway accidents and 
fires, among other causes, "a national disgrace,"l"l and bemoaned the 
"waste of life in American coal mining."112 Indeed, the casualties among 
American railroad workers during 1898 and 1899, reported the editors of 
Cassier's Magazine, were equivalent to "two and a half times the reported 
total of killed and wounded in the British Army in South Africa [in the 
ongoing Boer War]."113 
Worst of all, management engineers argued, "thousands of... acci- 
dents in mines, in factories, and on railroads" were "needless" and pre- 
ventable.ll4 In management engineers' view, wasteful competition 
among firms sustained the United States's comparatively high industrial 
accident rates; capital was expensive, while accidental injuries to employ- 
ees were cheap.115 Moreover, most late nineteenth-century economists 
and firms did not believe that workers charged a premium for dangerous 
workplaces in the form of higher wages.116 Inattention to expensive work 
part of the News's mission. Each issue of the magazine covered the week's major accidents, 
and the index for the year includes dozens of entries under the heading "accident." 
108. George Ethelbert Walsh, Accident-Preventing Devices in America: An American 
Criticism, 28 Cassier's Mag. 223, 226 (1905). 
109. See Day Allen Willey, Safety in American Railway Travel, 28 Cassier's Mag. 55, 55 
(1905). 
110. Walsh, supra note 108, at 223; see also Review of the Engineering Press, 12 Eng'g 
Mag. 692, 705-06 (1897) (observing the poor safety record of American railroads in 
comparison to the railroads of the United Kingdom). 
111. Herbert T. Wade, The American Museum of Safety Devices, 35 Eng'g Mag. 329, 
330 (1908). 
112. Clarence Hall & Walter O. Snelling, The Waste of Life in American Coal Mining, 
34 Eng'g Mag. 721, 721 (1908). 
113. Current Topics, 18 Cassier's Mag. 438, 441 (1900). 
114. Walsh, supra note 108, at 226. 
115. See, e.g., J.A. Holmes, Coal Mining Accidents in the United States and Their 
Prevention, 37 Cassier's Mag. 374, 374-75 (1910). 
116. Employers like Howell Cheney of Connecticut complained that compensation 
legislation was an attempt "to artificially raise a class of wages," the costs of which would 
inevitably have to be passed through to the consumer, not to the employee. Howell 
Cheney, Work, Accidents, and the Law, 19 Yale Rev. 255, 257-58 (1910). Similarly, in 
legislative hearings on workmen's compensation, firms fought bitterly for joint employer- 
employee contributions to workmen's compensation insurance funds. And both unions 
and employers struggled to push benefit levels in directions that they believed favored 
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safety measures thus offered firms in competitive industries the opportu- 
nity for substantial savings. Competition among machine shops, for ex- 
ample, had driven many shop owners to limit their investment in expen- 
sive safety provisions.117 Similarly, "ruinous competition" among coal 
mine operators had led them to adopt inefficient mining techniques and 
to neglect critical safety measures such as training employees in the use of 
explosives and electricity, in the handling of gases and coal dust, and in 
proper timbering techniques.118 The result was an "increasing waste of 
resources and the still more unpardonable increasing waste of human 
life-the yearly loss of 250,000,000 tons of coal and the killing or injuring 
yearly of 8,000 to 10,000 men."119 
According to American management engineers, the annual slaugh- 
ter in the coal mines also provided evidence of the ways in which primi- 
tive labor management practices produced wastefully high accident rates. 
Fatality rates in American bituminous coal mines, for example, doubled 
between 1880 and 1910, rising from two workers killed out of every thou- 
sand per year in 1880 to four in 1910.120 At first blush, most mining 
them. See Minutes of Evidence Accompanying the First Report to the Legislature of the 
State of New York by the Commission Appointed Under Chapter 518 of the Laws of 1909 
to Inquire Into the Question of Employers' Liability and Other Matters 93-94, 98 (1910) 
[hereinafter First Report to the Legislature]. If employers had believed that wages 
adjusted to reflect either the risk of accidents or the value of postaccident compensation 
benefits, these positions would have made little sense. Progressive reformers also put little 
stock in the theory of wage premiums. Adna Weber contended in the Political Science 
Quarterly that the notion of wage adjustments was a "legal fiction" with "no basis in fact." 
Adna Weber, Employers' Liability and Accident Insurance, 17 Pol. Sci. Q. 256, 258 (1902). 
"In theory," President Roosevelt observed in a 1908 message to Congress on employers' 
liability, workers would act as "experienced business men" and would exact a wage 
allowance for the risk of injury just as sophisticated lenders incorporated a risk-premium 
into rates of interest. "But as a matter of fact," he argued, "it is not practical to expect that 
this will be done by the great body of employees." Theodore Roosevelt, The Employers' 
Liability Law: From a Message of the President Read Before Congress, Jan. 31, 1908, in 2 
The Roosevelt Policy: Speeches, Letters and State Papers, Relating to Corporate Wealth 
and Closely Allied Topics 699, 702 (William Griffith ed., 1919). Judge Learned Hand of 
the Southern District of New York concurred; a "theoretical justice," he wrote in 1909, 
"might be accomplished if by a higher wage [the workingman] could insure himself." But 
the difficulty was that "even that would not answer the practical objection that actually he 
does not do it." Letter fromJudge Learned Hand, Federal Court, Southern District of New 
York, toJ.M. Wainwright, Chairman, Met. Life Bldg. (Nov. 17, 1909), in First Report to the 
Legislature, supra, at 74-75. The Wainwright Commission Report summed up this 
thinking when it concluded simply that the "laissez faire" theory of wages and risk "does 
not work out." Id. at 7. For an academic's account of the same point, see Seager, supra 
note 91, at 82-83. 
117. See Bentley, supra note 24, at 514. 
118. See Holmes, supra note 115, at 374-75. On the effects of competition in the coal 
mining industry on safety conditions in the mines, see generally William Graebner, Coal 
Mining Safety in the Progressive Period 155-75 (1976). 
119. Holmes, supra note 115, at 375. 
120. See Aldrich, supra note 88, at 42 fig. 2.1. Fatality rates in the anthracite mines 
typical of Eastern Pennsylvania declined dramatically from their heights in the 1850s and 
1860s to approximately three workers in every thousand per year by 1890. Beginning in 
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fatalities appeared to be the fault of the miners themselves. Roof falls 
were often caused by a miner's careless placement of supporting timbers; 
cave-ins often resulted from leaving insufficient coal in supporting coal 
pillars; and blasting mishaps often occurred while a miner carelessly ex- 
amined an apparently failed fuse, only to have the charge explode unex- 
pectedly.12' Moreover, roof falls, small cave-ins, and blasting mishaps 
were much more common than catastrophic mining disasters, accounting 
for at least three-quarters of all coal mining fatalities.122 But from the 
perspective of sophisticated mining engineers, extraordinarily high min- 
ing accident rates were in fact the result of the basic structure of labor 
management in the mines. Mine operators paid miners according to ton- 
nage rates that rewarded miners who ignored safety measures in return 
for increased yields.123 In particular, tonnage payments that did not pe- 
nalize miners for producing undesirably fine coal (known as "slack") en- 
couraged miners to employ dangerously large amounts of powder with- 
out first undercutting the coal face.124 "Shooting off the solid," as this 
practice was called, was exceedingly dangerous.125 
The basic design of the mines also helped to make American mining 
more dangerous than European mining. In England, "longwall" mine 
design placed miners along a few long coal faces.126 Such workers could 
easily be supervised by foremen. In addition, longwall mining minimized 
the danger of roof falls. In the United States, by contrast, the "room-and- 
pillar" method used a sprawling complex of small rooms propped up by 
coal and timber pillars.127 Miners worked in isolation in a labyrinth of 
tunnels and cut-outs in the coal seam. As a result, supervision was virtu- 
ally impossible, and roof falls were exacerbated by the multiplicity of 
small rooms. 
In both setting tonnage rates and adopting dangerous room-and-pil- 
lar mining practices, management engineers argued, mine owners had 
implemented poorly thought-out approaches to designing and managing 
work in American mines. Careless miners might also be necessary ante- 
cedents to many mining accidents. But miners would always be careless. 
Management systems, on the other hand, could be made more or less 
effective, and in this sense, ineffective management systems had pro- 
duced wasteful accident rates. 
1900, fatality rates in bituminous and anthracite mines roughly tracked one another. See 
id.; Anthony F.C. Wallace, St. Clair: A Nineteenth-Century Coal Town's Experience with a 
Disaster-Prone Industry 252-253 (1987); Witt, American Accident Law, supra note 87, at 
695. 
121. See Aldrich, supra note 88, at 49-55. 
122. See id. at 41-42; Graebner, supra note 118, at 8. 
123. See Aldrich, supra note 88, at 52; Mining and Metallurgy, 12 Eng'g Mag. 347, 349 
(1897). 
124. Aldrich, supra note 88, at 60. 
125. Id. at 52-54. 
126. See id. at 64; Whiteside, supra note 31, at 33. 
127. Aldrich, supra note 88, at 64. 
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III. 
Management engineers' answer to the industrial accident crisis was a 
twofold rationalization of the internal operations of the firm. Employers 
experimented with private forms of worker compensation in the form of 
firm-specific employee accident compensation funds, or "establishment 
funds" as they were often called. Managers seeking to rationalize the pro- 
duction process also began to advocate and experiment with new meth- 
ods of making work processes safer. 
As the Chandler thesis has it, the railroads pioneered in the field of 
management engineering.128 And it was on the railroads that employee 
accident relief funds first emerged as an important accident compensa- 
tion mechanism. The Philadelphia and Reading Railroad endowed a 
$20,000 accident fund for its coal mine workers after an 1875 strike in the 
Pennsylvania anthracite fields, and created an accident plan for its engi- 
neers in 1877.129 In the latter year-a year of massive railroad strikes- 
the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad considered and rejected 
the adoption of welfare benefits for the elite of its locomotive engi- 
neers.130 A year later, the Lehigh Valley Railroad of eastern Pennsylvania 
adopted an assessment-based fund for accident relief, financed by the 
joint contributions of employees and the railroad corporation itself.131 
It was only in 1880, however, that the nation's largest railroad com- 
panies began adopting systematic establishment funds. The Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad established an accident relief fund in 1880; the Penn- 
sylvania Railroad Company formed a relief department in 1886; the Phila- 
delphia and Reading in 1888; and the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy 
followed suit in 1889, as did the Pennsylvania Lines West of Pittsburgh 
128. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
129. Robert Asher, The Limits of Big Business Paternalism: Relief for Injured 
Workers in the Years Before Workmen's Compensation, in Dying for Work 19, 21 (David 
Rosner & Gerald Markowitz eds., 1987). 
130. See id. 
131. See William Franklin Willoughby, Workingmen's Insurance 307 (New York, 
Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1898); Interstate Commerce Comm'n, Third Annual Report 
360-61 (1890) [hereinafter ICC Rep.]. Willoughby described the Lehigh system as follows: 
The system is briefly this: A fund is accumulated by the voluntary contributions 
on the part of employes to the amount of one day's wages or less, but in no case 
to exceed three dollars, as called for by the administration of the fund, to meet 
demands for the payment of benefits. The company on its part makes a 
contribution equal in amount to the total contributions of the employes. Benefits 
are only paid in the case of accidents, and to employes who responded to the last 
call for contributions. The value of the daily benefit is equal to three-fourths of 
the amount contributed by the injured member on the last call, during a period 
not exceeding nine months. In case of death, $50 is immediately paid for funeral 
expenses, and subsequently to the family of the deceased, during two years, the 
accident benefit to which the deceased would have been entitled. 
Willoughby, supra, at 307. 
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and Erie.132 By 1889, an Interstate Commerce Commission survey found 
that twelve of eighty-five railroad companies nationwide had organized 
establishment funds.133 And by the second half of the 1890s, more than 
one in every five railroad employees in the country was covered by a rail- 
road accident relief association benefit program; indeed, fully one-fifth of 
American railroad workers were enrolled in one of the six largest relief 
associations: the Baltimore and Ohio; the Pennsylvania; the Pennsylvania 
Lines West; the Philadelphia and Reading; the Chicago, Burlington and 
Quincy; and the Plant System.134 
Outside the railroads, accident relief funds were less common.135 
The Cambria Iron Works-an early large scale steel-producing firm based 
in Johnstown in western Pennsylvania-established an accident fund fi- 
nanced through employee fines shortly after the Civil War.136 In the 
brewing industry, brewers and their employees in New York and Cincin- 
nati-mostly of German extraction-established jointly financed accident 
relief funds.137 And in mining, the Calumet & Hecla Mining Company in 
Michigan and the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Coal and Iron 
Company in Pennsylvania established mutual aid societies for their in- 
jured mining employees in 1877.138 The prominent organ and piano 
making firm of Alfred Dolge & Son in upstate New York adopted a Mu- 
132. See Emory R. Johnson, Railway Relief Departments, 8 Bull. of the Dep't of Lab. 
39, 42-43 (1897) [hereinafter Johnson, Railway Relief Departments]; Bureau Lab. Stat., 
The Baltimore & Ohio Relief Department, 4 Mass. Lab. Bull. 19, 19-32 (1897). 
133. See ICC Rep., supra note 131, at 342-82. The twelve railroads were the Atchison, 
Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company; the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company; the 
Central Vermont Railroad Company; the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad 
Company; the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad Company; the Delaware and 
Hudson Canal Company; the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company; the Northern Pacific 
Railroad Company; the Pennsylvania Railroad Company; the Philadelphia and Reading 
Railroad Company; the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Company (also known 
as the Pennsylvania Line West of Pittsburgh); and the Utah Central Railway Company. See 
id. at 342-83. 
134. See Johnson, Railway Relief Departments, supra note 132, at 42-43; Charles 
Richmond Henderson, Industrial Insurance in the United States 212-13 (2d. ed. 1911) 
(1909). 
135. See Willoughby, supra note 131, at 284 ("Certain it is that no other industry 
[than the railroads] has given equal attention to this matter."). 
136. See Asher, supra note 129, at 21. 
137. Nuala McGann Drescher, The Workmen's Compensation and Pension Proposal 
in the Brewing Industry, 1910-1912: A Case Study in Conflicting Self-Interest, 24 Indus. & 
Lab. Rel. Rev. 32, 36 (1970). 
138. Asher, supra note 129, at 21; 23 Comm'r of Lab. Ann. Rep. 429-39 (1909) 
[hereinafter Comm'r of Lab. Ann. Rep.] (Report on Workmen's Insurance and Benefit 
Funds in the U.S.); see also William B. Gates, Jr., Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars: An 
Economic History of the Michigan Copper Mining Industry 109 (1951) (discussing 
Calumet and Hecla Employees' Aid Fund, financed through equal contributions of 
employees and the company paying benefits of $25 per month up to eight months for 
disability, "$500 death benefits, and $300 for permanent disability"; the Fund compensated 
435 men for disability in its first ten months of operation and paid out death benefits to 
four families). 
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tual Aid Society for its employees in 1881, which by 1890 had expanded 
into a system of disability, death, and pension benefits.139 Similarly, the 
Buffalo Smelting Works, Steinway & Sons, and Bausch & Lomb Optical 
Company all established benefit associations before the turn of the cen- 
tury.140 Nonetheless, few manufacturing firms appear to have established 
significant, lasting accident relief funds before 1881. Of 461 establish- 
ment accident funds surveyed in 1908 by the Department of Labor, only 
twenty-one had been established between 1871 and 1880, and a mere five 
had been established before 1871.14' 
Outside the railroad industry, the creation and systematization of ac- 
cident funds began to accelerate significantly in the first decade of the 
twentieth century.142 Between 1900 and 1910, leading firms such as 
United Traction and Electric Company (1901), General Electric (1902), 
Westinghouse Air Brake (1903), New York Edison (1905), and Swift & 
Company (1907) created systematic injury compensation programs for 
their employees.143 At New York Edison, for example, the company's 
management announced that "[t]ry as we may, . . . some one will blun- 
der" and an accident would ensue.144 New York Edison officials believed 
that under the common law, "discontent, class feeling and an impression 
[of] ... injustice" inevitably followed.145 Thus, the firm undertook to 
redirect funds it previously had spent on liability insurance premiums to- 
ward the establishment of an accident compensation fund. The fund 
would compensate injured employees without regard to the firm's com- 
139. See Paul Monroe, An American System of Labor Pensions and Insurance, 2 Am. 
J. Soc. 501, 507 (1897). 
140. Henderson, supra note 134, at 204-05. There was a slight increase in the 
establishment of accident relief funds in the 1880s. See Comm'r of Lab. Ann. Rep., supra 
note 138, at 387-88; Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism: 1880-1940, at 
95-96 (Univ. Chi. Press 1976) (1970); Henderson, supra note 134, at 195. 
141. Comm'r of Lab. Ann. Rep., supra note 138, at 387. 
142. See, e.g., Conference of the Representatives of the Several Death and Accident 
Funds of the Pittsburgh Coal Co., Pittsburgh, Pa. (Feb. 6, 1902) (available in the Columbia 
University microfilm collection of the Wisconsin Historical Library's holdings on mutual 
benefit societies) [hereinafter Wisconsin Benefit Societies holdings] (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review); Constitution and By-Laws of the Pittsburgh Lamp, Brass and Glass 
Co. Employees' Beneficial Association (1906) (available in Wisconsin Benefit Societies 
holdings) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Constitution of the Allis Mutual Aid 
Society, Milwaukee, Wis. (rev. Mar. 12, 1907) (available in Wisconsin Benefit Societies 
holdings) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
143. See E.M. Atkin & H.M. Edwards, Compensation to Injured Employees: Plan of 
the New York Edison Company, Paper Delivered at the Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of 
the Association of Edison Illuminating Companies, Lenox, Mass. (Sept. 15-17, 1908) 
(1910) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Henderson, supra note 134, at 190-211, 
345-76; Magnus W. Alexander, Mutual Insurance Plan of the General Electric Company's 
Employes, at West Lynn, Mass., in Ferd C. Schwedtman & James Emery, National 
Association of Manufacturers of the United States of America, Accident Prevention and 
Relief 415, 415-26 (1911). 
144. Atkin & Edwards, supra note 143, at 5. 
145. Id. at 6. 
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mon law defenses. Moreover, the accident compensation fund, Edison's 
management hoped, would encourage the implementation of safety mea- 
sures and establish "good relations between the [c]ompany and its em- 
ployees."'46 At the Allis-Chalmers Company of Wisconsin in 1907, the 
firm replaced the informal circulation among the employees of "subscrip- 
tion rolls" in the event of a fellow employee's disability or death with a 
mutual aid society financed through employee contributions of twenty- 
five cents per month.147 
Manufacturing and mining firms established close to three times as 
many accident relief funds between 1891 and 1908 as during the preced- 
ing twenty years.148 By 1908, close to ten percent of all wage earners in 
the country fell under the auspices of one sort of industrial welfare policy 
or another.149 And in many of the most heavily industrialized regions, 
membership in an establishment fund was considerably more common. 
Crystal Eastman found that in Pittsburgh, for example, twenty-three per- 
cent of all injured workers were enrolled in employer establishment 
funds.150 
Most prominently, at the end of the decade two major firms con- 
trolled byJ.P. Morgan and his associates implemented accident relief pol- 
icies. In 1908 International Harvester adopted a voluntary accident bene- 
fit plan, which seventy-five percent of its employees had joined by the 
beginning of 1909.151 And in 1910 the U.S. Steel Company announced 
the establishment of its "Voluntary Accident Relief Plan" for employees of 
all U.S. Steel-affiliated firms.152 Many of the subsidiaries of U.S. Steel had 
less systematic relief policies in place before the announcement of the 
1910 plan. In 1901, for example, Andrew Carnegie had donated four 
146. Id. 
147. See Constitution of the Allis Mutual Aid Society, supra note 142, at 12. There 
was, in addition, a fifty cent initiation fee. Id. at 4. 
148. Comm'r of Lab. Ann. Rep., supra note 138, at 387-88. 
149. See Don D. Lescohier, Working Conditions, in 3 History of Labor in the United 
States 320 (Augustus M. Kelley, pub. 1966) (1935). A number of historians have 
mistakenly interpreted the Department of Labor's 1908 report on 461 establishment funds 
covering some 640,000 member employees as an estimate of the national total. See 
Brandes, supra note 140, at 96; Asher, supra note 129, at 27. In fact, the Department of 
Labor's report was a self-consciously partial survey of representative firms. See Comm'r of 
Lab. Ann. Rep., supra note 138, at 387. 
150. Eastman, supra note 92, at 157. A 1910 survey of members of the National 
Association of Manufacturers showed that seventeen percent of the NAM's membership 
operated a system of accident relief of one kind or another. See Schwedtman & Emery, 
Accident Prevention and Relief, supra note 143, at 381. 
151. See Benefit Plan, Industrial Accident Department of International Harvester Co. 
and Associated Cos. (1910) (available in Wisconsin Benefit Societies holdings, supra note 
142) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Robert Ozanne, A Century of Labor- 
Management Relations at McCormick and International Harvester 71-95 (1967); C.W. 
Price, Employee Benefit Association of the International Harvester Company, 33 Annals of 
the Am. Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 246, 252 (1909). 
152. See Charles A. Gulick, Labor Policy of the United States Steel Corporation 141 
(CXVI Columbia Univ. Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, No. 258, 1924). 
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million dollars to endow an accident relief fund for the employees of the 
Carnegie Steel Company. Carnegie's endowment created an accident re- 
lief fund that covered 85,000 employees in 1908, paying five hundred dol- 
lars to the widows of employees killed by work accidents, plus an addi- 
tional one hundred for every child, or between seventy-five cents and one 
dollar a day in disability benefits for disability arising out of injuries suf- 
fered while on duty.153 The great volume of claims, however, soon forced 
the Carnegie Fund to suspend all aid in cases of temporary disability last- 
ing less than one year.154 
Although the 1910 U.S. Steel initiative merely collected together and 
systematized existing programs such as the Carnegie endowment, it was 
nonetheless a signal moment in the history of American welfare capital- 
ism. For one thing, the sheer size of the U.S. Steel program was unprece- 
dented. Accident relief payments represented roughly two million dol- 
lars per year over the program's first five years,155 constituting twenty- 
nine percent of U.S. Steel's total employee welfare expenditures between 
1912 and 1923.156 And unlike prior employee accident relief policies, the 
U.S. Steel plan was financed entirely through employer contributions.'57 
Indeed, the central principles of the U.S. Steel relief fund were the ideas 
that (as one paper given at the 1910 conference of the American Iron 
and Steel Institute put it) "compensation to injured workmen is a legiti- 
mate charge against the cost of manufacture and that the victim of an 
industrial accident or his dependents should receive compensation, not 
as an act of grace on the part of his employer but as a right."'58 In the 
words of the president of the National Tube Company-one of the con- 
stituent corporations of the U.S. Steel family-it was not "right or fair to 
say that a man enters our employ knowing that the work is hazardous, 
and that therefore the risk is his. I think the industry should bear that 
burden."'59 The U.S. Steel accident compensation plan thus endorsed 
the notion-soon to be associated with work accident compensation stat- 
utes-that industry properly bore the responsibility for the costs of acci- 
dents to its employees. 
Establishment funds generally paid approximately one-half or two- 
thirds of an employee's weekly wages for durations ranging from thirty- 
nine weeks to up to two years during the course of a work-related disabil- 
ity.160 At large firms, death benefits generally ranged from seventy-five or 
153. See Comm'r of Lab. Ann. Rep., supra note 138, at 637-38. 
154. Eastman, supra note 92, at 162. 
155. See Raynal C. Bolling, Rendering Labor Safe in Mine and Mill, Iron & Steel 
Institute, supra note 24, at 106, 107. 
156. See Gulick, supra note 152, at 182-83 tbl. XV. 
157. See Dickson, supra note 62, at 56, 61. 
158. Id. at 63. 
159. William B. Schiller, Welfare Work in the Steel Industry, Iron & Steel Institute, 
supra note 24, at 119, 120; see also Bolling, supra note 155, at 106, 107-09. 
160. See Henderson, supra note 134, at 192; Comm'r of Lab. Ann. Rep., supra note 
138, at 409. 
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one hundred dollars to upwards of five hundred dollars, and sometimes 
even higher, depending on the fund and the wages of the deceased em- 
ployee.161 Railroad accident funds tended to be somewhat more gener- 
ous; in 1908, railroad relief funds found an average payment of five hun- 
dred eighty-eight dollars in death cases.162 At smaller firms, however, 
death benefits tended to be considerably lower. One study of forty-two 
NewJersey firms in 1904 found that an establishment fund at the sizeable 
Gibson Iron Works provided death benefits of between one thousand and 
two thousand dollars; at the forty-one remaining firms, however, death 
benefits ranged from twenty-five dollars at Newark'sJohnson and Murphy 
Shoe Company to one hundred fifty at Camden's Farr and Bailey Manu- 
facturing Company.163 
Virtually all establishment funds required that members sign waivers 
of the right to sue as a condition of enrollment in the accident compensa- 
tion plan, and where such waivers were unenforceable funds required 
injured members to elect between collecting fund benefits and bringing a 
risky tort claim.164 Most establishment funds also implemented mecha- 
nisms to minimize adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Thus, 
in some firms, such as the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, membership in 
an accident relief fund was a condition of employment, which allowed 
the firm to avoid the adverse selection problems endemic to elective 
membership.165 More frequently, however, firms adopted the approach 
taken by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, which left membership in 
the relief fund optional but implemented maximum age rules and re- 
quired physical examinations for all employees seeking to join.166 In ad- 
dition, relief funds employed "visiting committees" that combined the 
functions of wishing disabled employees a speedy return to health, on 
one hand, and checking for possible malingering, on the other.167 
The engineering profession argued that resting accident costs on the 
firm itself would have the effect of legitimating new claims of managerial 
161. See Comm'r of Lab. Ann. Rep., supra note 138, at 420-24; Henderson, supra 
note 134, at 193. 
162. Comm'r of Lab. Ann. Rep., supra note 138, at 274. 
163. See Henderson, supra note 134, at 199-201 tbl. I (reprinting results of New 
Jersey study). 
164. See Willoughby, supra note 131, at 316. In 1898, the Erdman Act made such 
election requirements illegal among interstate railroad workers. Erdman Act, ch. 370, 30 
Stat. 424 (1898). 
165. Johnson, Railway Relief Departments, supra note 132, at 42. 
166. In 1908, thirty-three of thirty-six railroad relief funds had optional membership 
rules combined with age and physical condition requirements for membership. Comm'r 
of Lab. Ann. Rep., supra note 138, at 271-72. Only seventy of the 458 nonrailroad firms' 
employee accident relief programs surveyed made membership a condition of 
employment. See id. at 394; Willoughby, supra note 131, at 286. On physical examinations 
as a premembership requirement, see Price, supra note 151, at 252-53. 
167. See ICC Rep., supra note 131, at 375 (statement of A.A. McLeod, Vice President 
and General Manager of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company). 
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prerogative in the operation and control of the enterprise.168 The Balti- 
more and Ohio Railroad's Relief Department, for example, drew praise 
in the 1890s from management engineers interested in the rationaliza- 
tion of labor management as "an intelligent and well-directed effort in 
the true line of industrial progress."169 Indeed, observers suggested that 
the expansion and systematization of such relief policies as the Baltimore 
and Ohio's "would do much to bring about a reconciliation [between 
capital and labor], to say nothing of the relief to the injured from the 
point of view of humanity."170 Similarly, in a series of articles that ap- 
peared in Engineering Magazine in 1905 and 1906, O.M. Becker advocated 
the adoption of a "square deal" for employee accident relief in order to 
accommodate the modern factory operative to the status of "merely a 
more or less mechanical attachment" to the machine tool.l17 If the new 
problem of the production process was the management of men rather 
than the development of new and better mechanization, employer relief 
policies offered the opportunity to foster employee loyalty in the increas- 
ingly depersonalized world of the large manufacturing enterprise.172 
In some cases, especially in the 1880s and 1890s and on the railroads, 
establishing new levels of managerial control of the workplace meant 
combating the threat posed by labor organizations to managerial domina- 
tion of the firm. The railway brotherhoods threatened to hinder manage- 
rial initiatives ranging from the implementation of new work rules to the 
adoption of new routes and scheduling. Nationwide railroad strikes in 
1877, 1886, and again in 1894 emphasized the disruptive potential of la- 
168. Historians of American management practices see the development of welfare 
capitalism in the 1920s as a response by firms to the need to accommodate workers to the 
changes ushered in by new scientific management strategies in the 1910s. See, e.g., 
Brandeis, supra note 15, passim. Historians generally see scientific management and 
employee welfare programs before the 1920s as two competing strands in the development 
of modern managerial techniques. See, e.g., Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy, supra note 
39, at 40-64; Nelson, Managers and Workers, supra note 29, at 55-78. Management 
engineers' ideas about employer accident relief policies, however, suggest that the 
antinomy of scientific management and welfare work was not especially sharp. 
169. Industrial Sociology, 11 Eng'g Mag. 346, 348 (1896). 
170. Thomas L. Green, Railways, 6 Eng'g Mag. 244, 246 (1893). 
171. See O.M. Becker (pts. 1 & 3), supra note 62, at 537, 823. 
172. See, e.g., Constitution and By-Laws: Employes' Mutual Benefit Association 
Pension System of the Minneapolis St. Railway Co., art. III, at 2 (1915) (available in 
Wisconsin Mutual Aid holdings, supra note 142) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(listing as an object of the association "to promote a helpful spirit of co-operation among 
the employees of the Company"); Emory R. Johnson, Railway Departments for the Relief 
and Insurance of Employes, 6 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 424, 424 (1895) ("The 
relief department is one of the many agencies that have been called into being to assist In 
the solution of the labor problem."); see also id. at 426-27 (arguing that the "chief' motive 
for the implementation of railway relief departments was "to cultivate a spirit of loyalty 
strong enough not only to prevent strikes, but also to prompt men to give the highest 
grade of service of which they are capable"). 
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bor organizations on the railroads.l73 Undermining worker allegiance to 
the brotherhoods thus became a central goal of railroad management, 
and railroad relief funds were frequently employed toward this end.174 
In 1887, for example, after the especially bitter Knights of Labor-led 
strike on many of the nation's railroads, the Philadelphia and Reading 
Railroad Company's statistician suggested to the railroad's president that 
an accident relief fund would be "the most expedient way by which an 
alienation of the men from orders such as the 'Knights of Labor' may be 
made effective, thereby establishing a closer relationship [between the 
road and its workers]."175 
Furthermore, in the eyes of management engineers, employer acci- 
dent insurance benefits would lead to substantial reductions in waste. 
The internalization of accident costs to the enterprise, they suggested, 
would rationalize the relationship between inputs and outputs in the pro- 
duction process. The editors of Engineering Magazine, for example, noted 
that "[i]t should hardly be necessary to observe that the real responsibility 
[for railroad accidents] is a matter which lies higher up than with the 
train crew."176 After all, "no military officer" would endeavor "to shift the 
responsibility of matters entrusted to his command to the shoulders of his 
inferiors."177 Nor, then, should railroad management suffer to allow the 
responsibility for work accidents to fall on the shoulders of employees. 
Yet at common law, the engineers argued, employers were able to ignore 
accidents involving employees because they were generally not liable for 
the costs of injuries to workers. The common law thus created perverse 
incentives to waste human labor power. Employer-financed relief funds 
and expanded employers' liability, by contrast, would encourage firms to 
reduce accident costs. As one railway management engineer put it, it 
seemed that "the proper way to prevent accidents on railroads was to lash 
a director of the company to the front of each locomotive."178 
173. See Walter Licht, Working for the Railroad: The Organization of Work in the 
Nineteenth Century 249-50 (1983). On the railroad strikes of the late nineteenth century, 
see generally Foner, supra note 45 (detailing 1877 strikes); Painter, supra note 45; Nick 
Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist (1982) (profiling prominent labor leader 
and describing strikes). 
174. Willoughby, supra note 131, at 317 (suggesting that establishment funds on the 
railroads were "organized by the roads in order better to control their employes, to prevent 
their striking, and to undermine the influence of their organizations"). 
175. Asher, supra note 129, at 23 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). On 
welfare capitalism as a strategy to undermine labor organizations, see Irving Bernstein, The 
Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-1933, at 185-88 (1960); Brandes, 
supra note 140, at 32; Montgomery, Fall of the House of Labor, supra note 30, at 242. 
176. Railway Accidents in England and America, 28 Eng'g Mag. 981, 983 (1905). 
177. Id. 
178. Id. Managerial engineers' professional aims were often in what economic 
historian Mark Aldrich has described as a kind of "creative tension" with the profit 
maximization of the firm. Aldrich, supra note 88, at 109. 
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IV. 
What did it mean for managerial engineers to identify the firm as the 
entity to which accident costs were properly internalized? The mid-nine- 
teenth-century law of work accidents had taken for granted that employ- 
ees were in the best position to prevent and avoid accidents. In the fa- 
mous case of Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Rail Road, for example, Chief 
Justice Lemuel Shaw ruled that employers were not liable for employee 
injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow employee because "[t]hese 
are perils which the servant is as likely to know, and against which he can 
as effectively guard, as the master."'79 In work accidents, he asserted, the 
safety of employees depended not so much on the care of the employer 
but rather upon "the care and skill" of the employees themselves.180 If 
Shaw had spoken about internalizing the costs of accidents, he presuma- 
bly would have said they should be internalized to the worker, not to the 
firm. 
The engineering literature of the late nineteenth century described 
a different kind of workplace, one that reflected both changes in the 
structure of work and management engineers' aspirations to the substitu- 
tion of managerial power for worker control. To be sure, the engineers 
argued that accidents at work almost always involved employee careless- 
ness, ignorance, and inattention. Boiler operators grew accustomed to- 
and thus complacent about-startlingly dangerous steam conditions;181 
miners held foolish folk ideas about the varying degrees of danger associ- 
ated with different concentrations of coal damp in mines;182 blasting 
workers resisted the implementation of scientifically tested safety de- 
vices;183 railroad engineers invariably grew accustomed to small but po- 
tentially disastrous deviations from prescribed safety procedures;'84 and 
workers in high technology fields such as electricity could not be trusted 
to understand the basic principles of safety in novel working environ- 
ments.185 In these respects, the engineers shared Shaw's view of the con- 
179. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 57 (1842). 
180. Id. at 59. 
181. As the Editors of Cassier's Magazine put it, 
Boiler accidents will probably for a long time continue to afford some of the best 
examples of dangerous carelessness among engine and boiler attendants. 
Familiarity ... breeds contempt, and it is familiarity with the dangers which are 
always associated with the use of steam apparatus that seems, in numberless cases, 
to have caused death and destruction around boilers. 
Current Topics, 11 Cassier's Mag. 162, 166-67 (1896); see also 2 Transactions of the Am. 
Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs 61 (1881) ("[T]here are three principal causes of steam-boiler 
explosions . . . the first is ignorance, the second is carelessness, and the third is utter 
recklessness."). 
182. See G. Farmer, Causes and Prevention of Disasters in Mines, 31 Cassier's Mag. 
296, 301-303 (1907). 
183. R.W. Raymond, Blasting in Large Cities, 30 Cassier's Mag. 561, 561-62 (1906). 
184. F.W. Haskell, The Causes of Accidents on American Railways, 28 Eng'g Mag. 321, 
323-25 (1904). 
185. Accidents in Power House Operations, 30 Cassier's Mag. 287, 287-88 (1906). 
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ditions under which work accidents occurred: They resulted from worker 
actions and worker negligence. But engineers differed from Shaw on the 
implications of employee carelessness. According to the engineers, if em- 
ployee carelessness was inevitable, and if occasional negligence, forgetful- 
ness, and ignorance were endemic to the human condition (and particu- 
larly so among workers whom engineers often viewed as uneducated, lazy, 
and careless), it stood to reason that accident prevention and the effi- 
cient rationalization of economic processes necessarily depended on the 
implementation of scientific approaches to the management of produc- 
tion, not on the workers themselves.'86 
What the engineering literature added up to was a new theory of 
causation for workplace accidents.187 Causation in accident cases was bi- 
lateral at the very least. Both the injured worker and the firm were neces- 
sary antecedents to any workplace accident; indeed, accidents inevitably 
involved any number of additional necessary parties. Yet engineers talked 
about causation in terms of which party had been best positioned to pre- 
vent the accident.188 And almost inevitably, their answer was that sophis- 
ticated firms, not incorrigibly careless workers, were best situated to cre- 
ate engineering solutions to work-accident problems. Accident costs, it 
followed, were properly internalized to firms rather than employees. 
This new theory of enterprise responsibility and causation helped 
give rise to the second part of engineers' answer to the industrial accident 
crisis: the beginning of a movement for industrial safety. Two exam- 
ples-boiler explosions and railroad collisions-will help flesh out this 
new causal theory in the management literature. 
Improvements in boiler safety present one of the few success stories 
in the otherwise dismal story of late nineteenth-century workplace safety. 
The first boiler explosions accompanied the early development and intro- 
duction of steam power into American industry in the 1830s.189 A grow- 
186. See, e.g., Railroad Accidents in America, 28 Eng'g Mag. 833, 835 (1905) 
(reporting on speech by H.D. Emerson at New York Railroad Club, arguing that railroads 
should move past blaming workers and instead adopt new systems designed to ensure 
safety without regard to the negligence or carelessness of employees). Historian David 
Moss and I have both developed this point, comparing Justice Shaw's view of risk in the 
workplace to the early twentieth-century way of thinking about such risks. See David A. 
Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager 233 (2002); Witt, 
Accidental Republic, supra note 12, ch. 4; John Fabian Witt, The Transformation of Work 
and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842-1910, 107 Yale LJ. 1467, 1469-70 (1998) 
[hereinafter Witt, Transformation of Work]. 
187. Economic historian Mark Aldrich describes precisely this shift among American 
businesses from blaming accidents on employee carelessness to blaming accidents on 
managerial failure in the safety movement of the 1910s. See Aldrich, supra note 88, at 
116-17. The point here is that safety engineers had been making the same claim for 
several decades. 
188. The leading contemporary account along these lines is Guido Calabresi, The 
Costs of Accidents (1970) [hereinafter Calabresi, Cost of Accidents]. 
189. John G. Burke, Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power, 7 Tech. & Culture 1, 2 
(1966). 
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ing number of establishments turned to steam power, and as boilers be- 
came more and more powerful, boiler explosions wreaked havoc in early 
American manufacturing. Fatal boiler explosions were reported as early 
as 1838, and in the 1850s and 1860s disastrous boiler catastrophes made 
headlines. In New York City, for example, the Hague Street Disaster of 
1850 claimed the lives of sixty-seven workers, and in Philadelphia an 1867 
explosion killed another twenty-eight people.190 All in all, boiler insur- 
ance firms estimated that over seven thousand people were killed in 
boiler explosions in the United States between 1883 and 1907.191 
Engineers in the 1870s, '80s, and '90s warned frequently of the dan- 
gers and accompanying costs associated with haphazard boiler use in 
steam powered manufacturing enterprises192 and on steam powered loco- 
motives193 and boats.194 "Among the dangers which menace a boiler," 
explained one engineer in 1891, "are explosion, corrosion, leakage, burn- 
ing, and leaky or dilapidated front or setting."195 And while some of 
these problems merely meant the waste of fuel or diminished power ca- 
pacity, others "herald[ed] danger to life and limb as well as wreckage of 
property."196 Indeed, J.M. Allen of the Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection 
and Insurance Company estimated that the roughly one thousand boiler 
explosions occurring in the United States between 1880 and 1886 caused 
three million dollars in damages to property, as well as some 1,500 deaths 
and many more injuries.197 
According to many engineers, however, boiler explosions might vir- 
tually be abolished through rational and scientific boiler construction, 
operation, and inspection. Engineers developed and advocated the use 
of automated devices that allowed operators to open and shut steam 
valves from a safe distance, for example,198 and developed new and 
190. See Aldrich, supra note 88, at 79-80. 
191. Id. at 80. 
192. See, e.g., William Barnet Le Van, The Lifetime or Age of Steam Boilers, 2 
Transactions of the Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs 503, 503-25 (1881) (describing boiler 
explosions at Wood & Bros. of Conshohocken, Pennsylvania); Fred H. Daniels, A Peculiar 
Explosion of a Boiler, 3 Cassier's Mag. 123, 123 (1892) (describing boiler explosion at 
Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Company in Worcester, Massachusetts); Current 
Topics, 11 Cassier's Mag. 332, 334 (1897) (describing close call involving weakened cast 
iron steam piping at a large manufacturing establishment); Mechanics, 2 Eng'g Mag. 547, 
548 (1892) (describing a "singular" boiler explosion at an English plant). 
193. See, e.g., Current Topics, 27 Cassier's Mag. 336, 337-38 (1905) (describing 
explosions arising out of careless use of boiler tube cleaners on steam powered railroad 
engines); Current Topics, 9 Cassier's Mag. 76, 78 (1895) (describing boiler and steam pipe 
explosions on railroad engines). 
194. See, e.g., Current Topics, 16 Cassier's Mag. 703, 704 (1899). 
195. Robert Grimshaw, Danger Signals About the Boiler, 1 Eng'g Mag. 158, 158-59 
(1891). 
196. Id. at 159. 
197. J.M. Allen, Steam Boiler Explosions, 1 Cassier's Mag. 191, 191 (1891). 
198. See Arthur Herschmann, The Protection of Steam Pipes from Accident, 34 
Eng'g Mag. 456, 459 (1907). 
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stronger designs for boiler construction.199 Most of all, engineers 
pointed to the extraordinary success of expert inspection of boilers as 
evidenced by the record of boiler insurance companies. Defective boil- 
ers, it was estimated, accounted for as many as seventy-five percent of all 
boiler explosions.200 It was "the special province of boiler inspection to 
discover" such defects.20' Boiler insurance firms such as the Hartford 
Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company, founded in 1867, col- 
lected comprehensive statistics on boiler accidents, which made it possi- 
ble for the first time to make scientific investigations into the relative 
merits of alternate boiler design.202 And by all accounts, boiler insurance 
and the accompanying inspections by trained engineers sharply reduced 
the incidence of boiler explosions.203 Indeed, although the engineering 
profession conceded that "such accidents can never be wholly got rid of," 
engineers believed that expert inspection had made "a long step ... in 
that direction."204 Boiler engineering, then, stood as a shining example 
of what rational engineering could do for workplace safety. 
Railroad collisions formed a second great preoccupation of accident 
prevention engineers in the 1890s, but here the results were ambiguous. 
Train collisions, in the words of one engineer, represented the "most dis- 
graceful, because entirely avoidable, class of accidents."205 In the 1880s 
and early 1890s, engineers had focused on improvements in the physical 
infrastructure of the railroad industry as the most productive way to re- 
duce the accident rate, developing and implementing improvements in 
bridge construction, track gauges, roadway and car design, automatic 
couplers, and air brakes.206 But by the middle and late 1890s and the 
first decade of the twentieth century, management engineers on the rail- 
roads had come to believe that employee negligence was far and away the 
greatest cause of railroad collisions.207 Nearly seventy percent of acci- 
dents on the railroads, according to one engineering estimate, were "due 
199. See R.S. Hale, Boiler Design and Boiler Explosions, 27 Eng'g Mag. 232, 232-46 
(1904). 
200. F.B. Allen, The Protective Value of Boiler Inspection, 4 Transactions of the Am. 
Soc'y Mech. Eng'rs 142, 143-44 (1883). 
201. Id. at 144. 
202. See id. at 144-45, 148. 
203. See id. at 148 (citing two explosions in 1881 out of 15,000 boilers insured with 
the Hartford company); W.A. Carlile, Boiler Insurance and Inspection, 11 Cassier's Mag. 
65, 65 (1896) (citing one explosion for every 11,000 boilers insured in the United 
Kingdom); see also Current Topics, 1 Cassier's Mag. 115, 115 (1891) (citing the success of 
the Steamboat Inspection Service's boiler inspections). 
204. Carlile, supra note 203, at 73. 
205. Haskell, supra note 184, at 322. 
206. See, e.g., Gen. Horace Porter, Safety Devices on Railroad Cars, 4 Cassier's Mag. 
239, 239-40 (1893); Robinson, supra note 106, at 525-60; Letters to the Editor, Air Brake 
Pump Performances, Letter from New York Air Brake Co., 5 Cassier's Mag. 151, 152-53 
(1893). 
207. See, e.g., The Prevention of Railway Accidents, 34 Eng'g Mag. 817, 817 (1908) 
("Accidents are the result of the breakdown of the man, not of the machine."). 
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entirely to the mental or physical state of the human agent."208 
"[A]dmirable rules for the government of employes," observed another 
railway engineer, "are habitually disregarded."209 At grade crossings, 
junctions, drawbridges, and passing tracks, engineers persistently and in- 
evitably violated state and company rules requiring them to stop, either 
out of concern to meet scheduling deadlines, or out of becoming accus- 
tomed to taking risks.210 As a result, it was futile to leave safety to the 
workers themselves.211 Indeed, in the engineers' view, "[m]en will be 
careless" inevitably, "and the railroad company should provide for this 
trait in human nature" by implementing automated safety devices that 
took the discretion and human agency out of railroad safety.212 
In particular, engineers advocated automated block and automated 
train stop systems as alternatives to the signaling system typically used by 
American railroads in the 1890s. Under the signaling system, railroad 
employees whose duty it was to give signals stood at critical junctures in 
the railroad line and used flags to give signals to oncoming traffic indicat- 
ing the presence of trains ahead. The difficulty with this approach, as the 
engineering press was quick to point out after railroad disasters, was that 
it left "a single employee to judge whether to protect the lives of half a 
hundred passengers the precautions laid down by the rules shall be ob- 
served."213 Poor judgment or carelessness by a signal man, or the deci- 
sion by an engineer to override the signal, could lead to catastrophe. The 
automated block system, by contrast, employed electricity-powered signal- 
ing systems that did not rely on individual signal men. Automatic train 
stops, in turn, employed automatic braking devices to stop trains whether 
or not the engineer applied the brakes.214 
Engineers experienced little success in introducing automated block 
systems or automated train stops. Both remained exceedingly rare on 
208. Current Topics, 27 Cassier's Mag. 255, 260 (1905). 
209. Haskell, supra note 184, at 323. 'Employe' was a common nineteenth-century 
spelling of employee. 
210. See, e.g.,Julien A. Hall, The Causes of Railroad Accidents, 9 Eng'g Mag. 720, 726 
(1895); Charles Hansel, The Evolution of Safety in Railway Travel, 16 Eng'g Mag. 599, 604 
(1899). 
211. See, e.g., Editorial, 28 Eng'g News 12, 12 (1892) (observing "[t]he lesson that it 
is not only human to err but human to be forgetful and careless" in the context of railroad 
accidents); Franklin L. Pope, Electricity, 4 Eng'g Mag. 285, 286 (1892) ("[I]t will no longer 
answer to depend, as is now done, solely upon the vigilance and promptness of the engine- 
driver, to avert accidents."). 
212. Hall, supra note 210, at 725. 
213. Editorial, 26 Eng'g News 34, 34 (1891). 
214. See id.; Editorial, supra note 211, at 12; Railroad Accidents in America, supra 
note 186, at 834-35; Thomas L. Greene, Railways, 6 Eng'g Mag. 897, 897 (1893-1894); 
Hansel, supra note 210, at 605; Charles A. Howard, Safety in American Railway Transport, 
34 Cassier's Mag. 3, 3-9 (1908); Prevention of Railway Accidents, supra note 207, at 819; 
see also Aldrich, supra note 88, at 169-71 (observing that railroad journals advocated the 
use of devices that could apply the brake "in spite of the engineman"). 
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American railroads.215 A larger, but still relatively small, portion of Amer- 
ican railroads implemented manual block signals. The manual block sig- 
nal system divided the track into sections (or "blocks"), and trains were 
prohibited from entering a block of track unless it was empty. The man- 
ual block system, however, still relied on enginemen to follow the signals 
and on railroad workers to follow the progress of trains through the 
blocks and to set signals accordingly.216 Moreover, only twenty-two per- 
cent of American railroad mileage was in the manual block system by 
1906.217 And between 1897 and 1907, passenger and employee fatalities 
from railroad collisions skyrocketed, increasing by almost four hundred 
percent.218 Only between 1922 and 1928 did the Interstate Commerce 
Commission briefly adopt new automated train stop rules. But by then 
the combination of more effective manual block systems and declining 
traffic density on the nation's railroads had already led to sharp declines 
in the collision rate.219 
Despite their differing levels of success, the common trend in the 
boiler and the railroad examples was the idea that the best way to prevent 
accidents and catastrophes in the modern industrial workplace was to re- 
move discretionary authority from the hands of the worker. "[H]uman 
nature is fallible," observed the editors of Cassier's Magazine in 1905.220 It 
was therefore "incumbent upon transportation experts to adopt every 
possible method and device to secure safety."221 "[I]f there is blame any- 
where," noted another engineering journal with reference to an 1892 
train disaster, "it rests with the company rather than with the operator, 
for the simple reason that human nature is not equal to the strain" of the 
constant vigilance required in railroading.222 Signaling systems and 
safety measures, observed still another engineer, were "a part of the duty 
of officials in charge of the conduct of transportation."223 Likewise, in 
boiler operations, rampant employee carelessness required expert 
inspection. 
Engineers applied their scientific approach to rationalized and effi- 
cient production to any number of other dangerous conditions in indus- 
215. See Aldrich, supra note 88, at 174-75. 
216. See id. at 20-21. 
217. See id. at 178. 
218. See id. at 169. A chief cause of the increase, ironically, appears to have been the 
introduction of air brakes, which encouraged faster speeds. See id. at 177-78. 
219. See id. at 178. 
220. Current Topics, 28 Cassier's Mag. 326, 327 (1905). 
221. Id. 
222. Editorial, supra note 211, at 12. 
223. Railway Accidents in England and America, supra note 176, at 983. 
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trial life. Bursting fly wheels and engine room explosions,224 blasting,225 
work under compressed air,226 mining,227 and railroad and electrical 
work228 all seemed to present similar problems of hazardous production 
processes in which proper engineering could effectively reduce the risk 
of accidents. In all of these areas, managers might reduce the "unneces- 
sary slaughter and maiming" incident to modern industry to "a theoreti- 
cal minimum."229 
As with accident compensation benefits, a generation of engineering 
ideas about industrial safety came together at the U.S. Steel Company, 
where in 1906 and 1907 managers consolidated its decentralized, plant- 
by-plant safety departments into a single Central Committee on Safety.230 
As the historian of the Steel Corporation's labor relations has observed, 
the safety movement.at U.S. Steel was the "real center" of the corpora- 
tion's subsequent labor relations policy, "the source from which practi- 
cally everything else has sprung."231 The Committee inspected safety 
conditions and acted as a clearinghouse for safety information in all U.S. 
Steel subsidiary plants. It developed and tested safety devices; dissemi- 
nated among employees "full details, photographs, diagrams and com- 
plete information of all matters dealing with . .. safety";232 and imple- 
mented such basic safety provisions as railings along high walkways, 
tunnels allowing for safe travel across railyards, enclosed gears, safer 
crane hooks, and belt and shaft guards, to name only a few.233 
There were obvious connections between new ideas about work 
safety and the roughly contemporaneous accident insurance benefit pro- 
grams. Firms that took on extra accident costs through accident benefit 
plans had increased reason to make their workplaces safe. The Dodge 
224. See, e.g., William Wallace Christie, Safety Appliances in the Engine Room, 32 
Cassier's Mag. 333, 333-49 (1907); Current Topics, 33 Cassier's Mag. 300, 304-06 (1907) 
(describing causes of disastrous fly wheel explosion at the Chicago Coated Board Company 
and arguing that it was "most important to exercise every caution in installing safety 
appliances for protection against explosions of fly-wheels"). 
225. See, e.g., Raymond, supra note 183, at 561-62. 
226. See, e.g., The Physiological Effects of Working Under Compressed Air, 30 
Cassier's Mag. 285, 285-86 (1906). 
227. See, e.g., C.M. Percy, Colliery Ventilating Machinery, 22 Cassier's Mag. 394, 394 
(1902); The Handling of High Explosives, 17 Eng'g Mag. 841, 841-42 (1899); Mining and 
Metallurgy, 11 Eng'g Mag. 583, 583-84 (1896) (describing methods for preventing 
explosions); Mining and Metallurgy, 2 Eng'g Mag. 264, 265-66 (1891) (describing 
methods of testing safety lamps); Mining and Metallurgy, 1 Eng'g Mag. 264, 264-65 (1891) 
(describing the relative inferiority of American safety lamps). 
228. See, e.g., W.M. Mitchell, The Safety Car-Coupler Problem, 5 Eng'g Mag. 519, 
519-23 (1893); Robinson, supra note 106, at 524-59. 
229. Harold Vinton Goes, Can Railroad Collisions Be Reduced to a Theoretical 
Minimum?, 34 Eng'g Mag. 632, 632 (1908). 
230. See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note 88, at 91-93; Leschohier, supra note 149, at 
367-68. 
231. Gulick, supra note 152, at 138. 
232. Id. at 139. 
233. Aldrich, supra note 88, at 127. 
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Manufacturing Company of Indiana, for example, implemented a set of 
accident relief benefits through the Dodge Mutual Relief Association,234 
while at the same time its management adopted the engineering view of 
work safety, placing "the blame for 75 per cent of factory accidents to the 
. . . indifferent attitude of the employer toward employe."235 Midvale 
Steel adopted a system of employer sponsored accident benefits in the 
same years in which Taylor had begun to reengineer its employment 
practices.236 And leading firms such as U.S. Steel set up both safety pro- 
grams and an accident benefits plan.237 
Notwithstanding prominent cases such as U.S. Steel, however, imple- 
mentation of new engineering ideas about work safety and accident relief 
in actual workplaces was a slow process. As the engineers' mock proposal 
to "lash" directors of railroad companies to the front of locomotives sug- 
gested,238 managerial engineers and those who controlled the firm often 
failed to see eye to eye. Indeed, outside of boiler explosions, railroad 
collisions, and other kinds of catastrophes that threatened to inflict con- 
siderable property damage or to generate considerable bad publicity, 
many late nineteenth-century firms exhibited relatively little interest in 
adopting many of the safety measures and accident programs advocated 
by the management engineering experts. 
A chief obstacle to such schemes was their cost. The American Man- 
ufacturing Company of New York City, for example, estimated that its 
private accident relief fund increased its accident costs five-fold over the 
common law liability rules.239 U.S. Steel estimated that private accident 
programs cost millions of dollars each year over and above its employers' 
liability costs.240 Unsurprisingly, then, such accident programs were initi- 
ated most frequently in firms that were protected in some way from com- 
petitive pressures, either by dominant market positions as in the case of 
U.S. Steel, or by a combination of natural monopoly and cost-plus rate 
regulation as in the case of the railroads. Outside such industries, it was 
the rare firm that could say with Edward O'Toole of the United States 
Coal and Coke Company that it would "gladly pay the [additional costs] 
234. Memorandum from W.L. Chandler to the members of the Dodge Mutual Relief 
Association and Dodge Club, Misawaka, Ind. (uly 31, 1914) (suggesting revised bylaws for 
the Dodge Mutual Relief Association) available at the Am. Ass'n for Lab. Legis. Papers, 
Kheel Center for Labor Management Documentation and Archives, M.P. Catherwood 
Library, Cornell Univ. [hereinafter Kheel Center collection] (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
235. Blame for Accidents is Laid to Employers, Lab. Advocate (Birmingham, Ala.), 
Oct. 30, 1914 at 1. 
236. See 14 Report of the Industrial Commission 352 (1901). 
237. See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text. 
238. Supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
239. Commission Appointed under Chapter 518 of the Laws of 1909 to Inquire into 
the Question of Employers' Liability and Other Matters, Report to the Legislature of the 
State of New York 160 (Mar. 19, 1910) (conventionally known as the "Wainwright Report"). 
240. See Bolling, supra note 155, at 107-09 (estimating a cost of two million dollars 
per year in 1912). 
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necessary to permit the business to be conducted in a more safe and hu- 
mane manner."241 
Beginning around 1910, many of the nation's most sophisticated 
firms joined a complex coalition of progressive reformers and labor un- 
ions to support work accident compensation legislation.242 In supporting 
compensation statutes, such firms were led by their management engi- 
neers, who had cautiously supported broader employer liability in work 
accident cases since the early 1890s.243 Workmen's compensation would 
impose the costs of accident relief benefits across entire industries and 
would at the same time reward safe workplaces through reduced compen- 
sation costs. With the enactment of workmen's compensation statutes be- 
tween 1910 and 1920 in all but a few states from the deep South, the ideas 
of managerial engineers were widely implemented in American work- 
places. Safety engineers in the 1910s established minutely detailed sets of 
work rules for 
safe ways to pile materials, safe places to stand while dressing 
drive belts, safe methods of placing ladders and of climbing 
down them, safe methods of lifting, safe ways to sharpen a knife, 
safe ways to attach a lifting hook, open a fire door, feed a saw, 
tighten a nut, rig a gangway, lift a load, and move a cart ... 
and even "safe ways to dress," including safety shoes, special gloves, safety 
goggles, and hair nets.244 And as it turned out, the reengineering of 
workplace safety after 1910 helped cause fatal employee accident rates to 
fall off sharply in manufacturing industries and on railroads.245 
241. Luther Anderson, Workmen's Compensation: An Address Before the West 
Virginia Bar Association 19, White Sulpher Springs, W. Va. (July 14, 1910), available at 
Workmen's Compensation 1908-1910 folder, Kheel Center collection, supra note 234 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
242. John Fabian Witt, Workmen's Compensation and the Logics of Social Insurance 
52-64 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law Research, Paper No. 0241, 2002), at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/SOL3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=311582 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
[hereinafter Witt, Logics of Social Insurance]. 
243. As early as 1892, for example, an article in The Engineering Magazine endorsed the 
German compensation approach to the problem of workplace accidents as most likely to 
reduce the number of accidents in the United States. See Leicester Allen, Mechanics, 4 
Eng'g Mag. 605, 605 (1893). Three years later, the News's editors positively reviewed- 
though with somewhat more skepticism this time-the English debate over industrial 
accident compensation reform. See Liability of Employers for Injuries to Workmen, 10 
Eng'g Mag. 134, 134-35 (1895). And by the first decade of the twentieth century, support 
for some kind of European-style social insurance mechanism in work accident cases was 
widespread among management engineers. See, e.g., Miles M. Dawson, Labor Insurance 
in the United States, 39 Eng'g Mag. 411, 411-13 (1910); Wm. Mayo Venable, Industrial 
Accidents and Liability of Employers, 41 Eng'g Mag. 721, 728-30 (1911); Insurance of 
Labour in Germany, 33 Eng'g Mag. 625, 625 (1907); Insurance of Labour in Italy, 33 Eng'g 
Mag. 105, 105 (1907). 
244. See Aldrich, supra note 88, at 133. 
245. Id. 
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V. 
What can it mean to identify enterprise liability in the middle and 
late twentieth century as a consequence-unintended, unforeseen, or 
otherwise-of the efforts of scientific managers at the turn of the twenti- 
eth century? Surely there were any number of causal factors involved in a 
phenomenon as vast as the growth of tort liability across fields as diverse 
as products liability, medical malpractice, and landowners' and occupi- 
ers' liability, to name only a few of the most prominent. No account of 
these developments could possibly hope to leave out such features of the 
American tort system (many of them peculiar to the United States) as jury 
trials, the common law method of incremental policymaking by politically 
insulated judges, contingency fees, the absence of loser-pays legal fees, 
and relatively less well developed public insurance mechanisms such as 
national health insurance. Each of these factors no doubt contributed to 
the middle to late twentieth-century expansion of tort liability in the 
United States. 
When I describe scientific management ideas as a cause of the enter- 
prise liability revolution that followed some number of decades thereaf- 
ter, I mean to single out these ideas as one necessary cause among others. 
Ideas about the nature of the firm were preconditions to the enterprise 
liability phenomenon. Consider, for example, the argument that ad- 
vances Warren Court era judicial activism as a critical factor in the devel- 
opment of enterprise liability notions in the law.246 Ajudicial willingness 
to make bold doctrinal moves may well have been necessary to the trans- 
formations in tort doctrine, but the mere willingness to depart from ex- 
isting legal rules says little about the direction any such departure will 
take. Judicial activism might, after all, have produced rollbacks in enter- 
prises' exposure to liability, just as tort judges in the 1980s and 1990s have 
cfrawn back from some of the most far reaching implications of the enter- 
prise liability revolution. None of the various institutional factors ad- 
vanced in the literature are sufficient to explain enterprise liability absent 
a set of ideas upon which the decisions making up the law of enterprise 
liability can rest. And in the United States, these ideas were first brought 
into the public eye by those early generations of managerial engineers 
who sought to rationalize the nature of the firm. 
In this last Part, I sketch some lines of influence between scientific 
management in the firm and enterprise liability in tort, tracing the intel- 
lectual premises of the former as they spread into the latter. Accounts of 
the origins of enterprise liability have pointed toward the enactment of 
workmen's compensation statutes in the 1910s as a foundational moment 
for the subsequent expansion of enterprise liability.247 Scholars such as 
246. See Schuck, supra note 9, at 12-14; Schwartz, Beginning and Possible End, supra 
note 8, at 609-10. 
247. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of 
the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461, 465-67 (1985) 
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George Priest, for example, argue that three interrelated premises, each 
embodied in the workmen's compensation statutes, supported the devel- 
opment of enterprise liability doctrines. The principle of cost intemraliza- 
tion holds that firms should pay for the costs characteristic of their enter- 
prises, including the costs of their employees' injuries arising out of and 
in the course of employment.248 The principle of cost spreading holds that 
the cost of workplace accidents is properly shifted to the party best able to 
bear and spread the costs.249 Finally, the principle of enterprise power and 
individual powerlessness holds that contract or market mechanisms are inef- 
fective and even pernicious in allocating the costs of injuries either be- 
tween employers and employees, or between sellers and consumers.250 
Together, these ideas formed what mid-century torts scholar Wex Malone 
called the "contagious principle of workmen's compensation."251 Ac- 
cording to Priest and others, realist and postrealist legal scholars in the 
middle of the twentieth century drew these ideas from workmen's com- 
pensation and applied them to a broad array of torts cases, ranging from 
automobile accidents to products liability to medical malpractice.252 
The workmen's compensation account of enterprise liability is 
largely persuasive, as far as it goes. We find in the workmen's compensa- 
tion debates, for example, what may be the first use of the phrase "enter- 
prise liability" in the literature, in a paper given by Charles Herbert Swan 
at an American Academy of Political and Social Science meeting in 
[hereinafter Priest, Invention of Enterprise Liability]. Other accounts tracing enterprise 
liability to workmen's compensation include Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, 
Understanding Enterprise Liability: Rethinking Tort Reform for the Twenty-First Century 
21-37, 78-79 (1995); Mark. C. Rahdert, Covering Accident Costs: Insurance, Liability, and 
Tort Reform 16-21, 23 (1995); Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and 
Common Law Strict Liability, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1285, 1287 (2001); Rabin, Tort Law in 
Transition, supra note 8, at 5-6. More proximate explanatory factors cited in the literature 
include: 1960s era distrust of institutions and markets, e.g., Schuck, supra note 9, at 6-8; 
Rabin, Tort Law in Transition, supra note 8, at 5 n.l9; Schwartz, Beginning and Possible 
End, supra note 8, at 615-17; the depersonalization of medical care services, e.g., Rabin, 
Tort Law in Transition, supra note 8, at 5; "rising expectations" for the quality of life and 
for personal health, e.g., Rabin, Tort Law in Transition, supra note 8, at 7; the judicial 
adoption of new probabilistic approaches to causation questions, e.g., Schuck, supra note 
9, at 8-9; a newly generalized social expectation of what legal historian Lawrence Friedman 
calls "total justice," Lawrence M. Friedman, Total Justice 59-63 (1985); and changing 
conceptions of the proper role for the judiciary in American government during the 1960s 
as a necessary precondition for the judge-made transformation of torts, e.g., Schuck, supra 
note 9, at 12-14; Schwartz, Beginning and Possible End, supra note 8, at 609-10. 
248. See Priest, Invention of Enterprise Liability, supra note 247, at 478, 481. 
249. See id. at 470-83. 
250. See id. at 483-96; Schuck, supra note 9, at 6-8; Schwartz, Beginning and Possible 
End, supra note 8, at 615-17. 
251. Wex S. Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's 
Compensation, Nat'l Ass'n of Claimants' Compensation Att'ys LJ., May 1952, at 20 & Nov. 
1952, at 44. 
252. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 247, at 21-68; Rahdert, supra note 247, at 23-35; 
Priest, Invention of Enterprise Liability, supra note 247, at 465-505; Rabin, Tort Law in 
Transition, supra note 8, at 5-6. 
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1911.253 Swan advocated an approach to strict liability in work accidents, 
"what we may call," he suggested, "the principle of enterprise liability for 
industrial injuries."254 
The question left open by the workmen's compensation theory of 
enterprise liability, however, is whence derived the principles of work- 
men's compensation? How and why did American law come to the core 
principles-cost internalization, cost spreading, and worker (or con- 
sumer) powerlessness-that underlay the workmen's compensation stat- 
utes and the subsequent enterprise liability revolution? It is here that we 
see the importance of the scientific management movement. Charles 
Herbert Swan, interestingly, was not a lawyer, but rather an engineer.255 
It was no coincidence that engineers helped to develop the phrase "enter- 
prise liability." The movement to expand enterprise liability that charac- 
terized the dramatic changes in American tort law in the second half of 
the twentieth century rested on the same core elements that undergirded 
the management engineers' claims to increased managerial control of 
the firm. Management engineers, as we have seen, argued that manage- 
ment was in the best position to establish and monitor efficient work 
processes and to minimize the frequency and severity of accidents, and 
that workers themselves were unequipped to prevent workplace accidents 
effectively because of their inferior institutional position, their lack of 
training and education, and their ostensibly habitual carelessness and ig- 
norance.256 These same managerial engineers, in turn, provided impor- 
tant support to workmen's compensation statutes at the time of their en- 
actment.257 It was but a short step from these ideas to the theory that 
enterprises themselves were properly responsible for the costs of injuries 
incident to their operations more generally. 
Ultimately, the three premises of the ideology of enterprise liability 
may be reduced to a single proposition-what we might call the idea of 
managerial domination-and its inverse. The proposition holds that with 
respect to managing risk, well managed enterprises are in a superior 
structural and informational position than individuals such as workers 
and consumers. The inverse to the proposition, naturally, is that individ- 
uals-whether workers or consumers-are not in a position to evaluate, 
prevent, or provide for the dangers inhering in modern enterprise. 
These two closely related propositions lead ineluctably to each of the 
three claims of the ideology of enterprise liability. First, they solve the 
253. Charles Herbert Swan, Enterprise Liability for Industrial Injuries, 38 Annals Am. 
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 257 (1911). 
254. Id. at 259. 
255. See Charles A. Allen & Charles H. Swan, Report of Engineers Charles A. Allen 
and Charles H. Swan to the Special Committee of Salem City Council Relating to Salem 
and Peabody Sewerage (Boston, Fish & Libby 1898); Theodore Horton & Charles H. Swan, 
Hydraulic Diagrams for the Discharge of Conduits and Canals (3d ed. 1922) (identifying 
Swan as a member of the American Society of Civil Engineers). 
256. See supra Part IV. 
257. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
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difficult causation problem posed by all bilateral accidents: Who caused 
the accident? Both parties to a two party accident, after all, are necessa- 
rily its causal antecedents. The claim that enterprises and their managers 
are in the better position to prevent such accidents, however, allows the 
pragmatic conclusion that the enterprise (rather than the worker) can 
usefully be identified as the cause of the accident.258 Second, the pro- 
position of managerial and enterprise superiority purports to solve the 
equally difficult problem of determining which of two parties is the best 
spreader of accident costs.259 Both enterprises and individuals, of course, 
are able to buy insurance to spread the cost of accidents. But it follows 
from the idea of the enterprise's structural superiority that enterprises 
stand in a better position to buy insurance, both with respect to informa- 
tion about the nature of the risks involved in the enterprise and with 
respect to power in the insurance market. Third, and relatedly, the pro- 
position of managerial superiority and individuals' relative incapacity 
leads to the conclusion that the simple contract mechanism of compen- 
sating wage differentials to pay employees for the risks they take cannot 
adequately allocate the costs of accidents.260 
The ostensible superiority of managers as administrators of risk, for 
which management engineers and employers advocated at the turn of the 
twentieth century, animated torts thinking in the decades following the 
enactment of workmen's compensation laws. Early twentieth-century le- 
gal scholars argued that in those areas of employers' liability not gov- 
erned by workmen's compensation, such as maritime and railroading 
cases, the treatment of the "constant toll of injuries" as "an overhead 
item" for industry would best encourage "better ship construction . . . 
[and] increased operating efficiency."261 It was no great leap in logic to 
apply the rationales supporting enterprise liability for workplace injuries 
to a wide array of the injuries characteristic of modern economic life. 
Before the first wave of states had finished enacting workmen's compen- 
sation, law reviews were publishing calls for the adoption of strict enter- 
prise liability principles in railroad passenger accidents262 and automo- 
258. See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for 
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 84-91 (1975). 
259. See Fleming James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability 
Insurance, 57 Yale LJ. 549, 551-52 (1948). 
260. For an updated account along these lines, see Steven P. Croley &Jon D. Hanson, 
Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 
716-21 (1993). 
261. Gustavus H. Robinson, Legal Adjustments of Personal Injury in the Maritime 
Industry, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 223, 223 (1930); see also Francis H. Bohlen, Casual Employment 
and Employment Outside of Business, 11 Cal. L. Rev. 221, 240-41 (1923) (arguing for 
application of workmen's compensation statutes to excepted casual employees on ground 
that the cost of injuries to casual employees should be "as much a part of the cost of 
production as those operations habitually done by the employer's regular ... force"). 
262. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 247, at 25; Arthur A. Ballantine, A Compensation 
Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 708-09 (1916). 
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bile injury cases.263 And by the 1920s and 1930s, American legal 
academics sought to generalize the premises of the management engi- 
neer initiatives that had begun in the final decades of the nineteenth 
century. Realists such as Leon Green argued that liability was generally 
best placed on parties "in charge of the operation of complex and dan- 
gerous machinery," who could best take "preventive or prophylactic" 
steps.264 The trend was especially apparent in the field of consumer inju- 
ries. Commentators urged expanded manufacturers' liability to third 
parties for defective products and unsafe food on the ground that such 
liability would internalize the costs of injuries such that "[t]he loss conse- 
quently will be borne by those who are interested in ... safe production 
and preparation,"265 or such that "losses . . . will most effectively induce 
preventive measures."266 Individuals, by contrast, whether consumers or 
workers, were understood to be powerless and at the mercy of manufac- 
turers and employers.267 Even the aging Joseph Beale, dean of the for- 
malist scholarship of the early twentieth century, believed that 
"[o]ccupational injury is a necessary part of industry" and that "the cost 
of insuring against such injury is as much part of the cost of a yard of 
cloth as the cost of the labor of the weaver or of the night watchman."268 
The scholarly literature in torts signaled the beginning of a sea 
change in the basic premises of tort scholars toward thinking about risk 
management in scientific terms, and in particular toward reallocating ac- 
cident costs so that they would be borne by firms rather than individual 
consumers or employees. In 1929, William O. Douglas (then of the Yale 
263. See Ernest C. Carman, Is a Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation Act 
Advisable?, 4 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1919); Wayland H. Elsbree & Harold Cooper Roberts, 
Compulsory Insurance Against Motor Vehicle Accidents, 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 690, 691, 
699-703 (1928); Robert S. Marx, Compulsory Compensation Insurance, 25 Colum. L. Rev. 
164, 179-87 (1925); Weld A. Rollins, A Proposal to Extend the Compensation Principle to 
Accidents in the Streets, Sat. Evening Rec., May 31, 1919, reprinted in 4 Mass. L.Q. 392, 
395-96 (1919); Comm. to Study Comp. for Auto. Accidents, Report to the Columbia Univ. 
Council for Research in the Social Sciences 18-20, 132 (1932). 
264. Leon Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 789, 799 (1930); see also Leon 
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (pt. 2), 29 Colum. L. Rev. 255, 276 (1929) 
(advocating expanded liability in railroad crossing accidents on the theory that railroad 
managers are best able to design preventative safeguards). 
265. Jacob Lutsky, Notes and Comment, Developments in the Application of the 
Buick Doctrine, 18 Cornell L.Q. 128, 133 (1932). 
266. Note, The Marketing Structure and Judicial Protection of the Consumer, 37 
Colum. L. Rev. 77, 77 (1937) (citing, inter alia, Karl N. Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on 
the Law of Sales 341 (E.M. Morgan ed., 1930)). 
267. Thus, as early as the 1930s, commentators saw and applauded in the law a drift in 
manufacturers' liability away from contract principles that limited liability to immediate 
purchasers in privity with the manufacturer, toward tort principles that at once expanded 
the range of potential downstream plaintiffs and limited manufacturers' rights to limit 
their liability by contract. See, e.g., Charles Keating Rice, Notes and Comment, Liability of 
a Manufacturer to a Sub-Vendee, 18 Cornell L.Q. 445, 446-47 (1933). 
268. Joseph H. Beale, Social Justice and Business Costs-A Study in the Legal History 
of Today, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 608 (1936). 
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Law School, having just left Columbia in protest of the appointment of 
Young B. Smith as dean269) argued in the Yale Law Journal that tort doc- 
trine ought to be reoriented around what he called "administration[ ] of 
risk concepts," under which accident costs would be allocated to the party 
best able to prevent and distribute the costs in question.270 Accident 
costs, he argued, were often best allocated to the party who has "more of 
that 'control' which an effective, efficient risk preventer needs."271 
If employers were in a better position than employees to prevent 
work injuries, perhaps firms were likely to be in a better position than any 
number of other actors (consumers, third parties, etc.) to prevent a wide 
range of accidents. Workmen's compensation statutes, noted Karl Llew- 
ellyn in a 1924 address to the American Economic Association, had 
placed accident costs on the party "not only best able to distribute, but 
best able to prevent" industrial accidents.272 In Llewellyn's view, the law 
had already begun (slowly) to apply the same principle in other fields. 
Blasting operations were strictly liable for injuries to bystanders; the 
"growing common law tendency" was to make product manufacturers in- 
surers of their products.273 Llewellyn's conclusion warrants quoting in 
full: "In one, the producing laborer is the object of concern; in one, the 
bystander or neighboring owner; in a third, the consumer. But all alike 
recognize the dependence of laborer, bystander or consumer on an in- 
dustry with which as an individual he cannot cope ...."274 Llewellyn's 
point was that the principles of workmen's compensation-and more 
specifically, the principles of scientific management's reengineering of 
the workplace-might be applied much more broadly than merely to 
work-accident legislation. 
By the 1940s and 1950s, the idea that American manufacturers and 
their engineers were in a strong position to design products so as to mini- 
mize the risk of injury to fallible consumers was widely held among legal 
academics.275 It was "large units, such as transportation companies, gov- 
ernment, and insurance companies," argued Fleming James and John 
269. Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 1927-1960, at 74 (The Lawbook Exchange 
2001) (1986); Julius Goebel, Jr., A History of the School of Law, Columbia University 
304-05 (1955). 
270. William O. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (pt. 1), 38 
Yale L.J. 584, 587-88 (1929); see also Moss, supra note 186, at 231. 
271. Douglas, supra note 270, at 601. For an earlier, less systematic application of 
some of the same risk management notions to the same doctrinal problem of vicarious 
liability, see the article by Douglas's nemesis at Columbia, Young B. Smith, Frolic and 
Detour, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444, 716-31 (1923). 
272. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 665, 680 (1925). 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
275. See, e.g., Harold A. Katz, Comment, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for 
Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 867-71 (1956) (arguing for 
expanded manufacturer liability in light of manufacturer ability to design safer 
automobiles). 
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Dickinson in 1950, not individuals, that were "in a strategic position to 
reduce accidents."276 In subsequent decades, this congerie of closely re- 
lated ideas reached perhaps its fullest articulation in the work ofJames's 
student, Guido Calabresi, who put into sophisticated economic terms the 
intuitions that had percolated in the literature going back to Douglas and 
even earlier, to the theorists of workmen's compensation legislation.277 
The proposition of managerial domination in the products context 
was not a necessary or inevitable perspective. To be sure, it is widely 
agreed that manufacturers are in a better position than consumers to 
know about the risks of their products.278 Yet as students of accidents 
and insurance regularly point out, individual consumer behavior is also a 
critically important factor in products cases, and here consumers often 
have dramatic advantages over firms as avoiders of accidents.279 Moreo- 
ver, individuals often have private information about their own risk 
profiles that firms do not.280 
Nonetheless, in what is now a familiar story, judges in the nation's 
state courts broadened the reach of these risk management ideas into an 
array of new fields.28' New products liability cases held manufacturers 
and sellers liable for manufacturing282 and design defects,283 as well as 
for failures to warn.284 Courts also recognized new tort actions for the 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.285 Moreover, 
courts abolished traditional common law immunities that had protected 
276. Fleming James, Jr. & John J. Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 
63 Harv. L. Rev. 769, 780 (1950) ("[A] system of absolute liability tends to increase the 
pressure towards accident prevention on large groups and enterprises, where we have seen 
it will do the most good, rather than on the individual, where it will do relatively little 
good."). Priest emphasizes the important role of Fleming James, perhaps to excess given 
the array of scholars from the 1910s onward, on whom I touched in the preceding 
paragraphs. See Priest, Invention of Enterprise Liability, supra note 247, at 470-83. 
277. See Guido Calabresi, Costs of Accidents, supra note 188; Guido Calabresi, Some 
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale LJ. 499 (1961). On Calabresi 
and the history of enterprise liability, see Keating, supra note 247, at 1308-17. 
278. E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of 
Products Liability, 14 J. Legal Stud. 535, 544-47 (1985). 
279. James A. Henderson Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and 
Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 
213, 226 (2000); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical 
Synthesis, 97 Yale LJ. 353, 356, 392-98 (1988). 
280. Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and Public 
Policy 35 (1986). 
281. For accounts of the line of cases recounted in the next several paragraphs, see 
Schuck, supra note 9, at 8-14; Keating, supra note 247, at 1297-99; Moss, supra note 186, 
at 216-52; Priest, Invention of Enterprise Liability, supra note 247, at 496-519; Rabin, Tort 
Law in Transition, supra note 8, at 7-14; Schwartz, Beginning and Possible End, supra note 
8, at 605-20. 
282. E.g., Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 957, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1972). 
283. E.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 504-06 (8th Cir. 1968); 
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 321 A.2d 737, 745 (Md. 1974). 
284. E.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Mass. 1985). 
285. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21 (Cal. 1968). 
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charities from tort liability,286 and dismantled the rules that insulated the 
owners and occupiers of land from liability for injuries to trespassers and 
licensees.287 In these and any number of other areas, the liability expo- 
sure of business enterprises in American tort law expanded 
dramatically.288 
The language of the now-famous twentieth-century cases shared the 
basic premises of the management engineers' turn-of-the-century cam- 
paign to establish and legitimate ideas about the proper scope of manage- 
rial prerogatives and responsibilities. Beginning with Cardozo's 1916 
opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,289 courts extended the liability 
of manufacturers for manufacturing defects beyond those to whom the 
manufacturer sold the defective product.290 In doing so, the famous Car- 
dozo opinion implied a new and broader view of the capacity of manage- 
ment to guard against manufacturing defects, and thus of the obligations 
of management in the manufacturing process. The manufacturer's duty 
of vigilance made sense precisely because that vigilance could be effec- 
tive.291 In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno (1944), the California 
Supreme Court held a bottling company liable for damages to a waitress 
caused by an exploding bottle.292 The case is less famous for the majority 
holding itself than for the concurring opinion, in which Judge Roger 
Traynor agued for the extension of MacPherson to incorporate a strict lia- 
bility standard for manufacturers in products liability cases on the 
grounds that "the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard 
against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot."293 Adopting the 
managerial failure theory of causation pioneered by the management en- 
gineers of 1900, Traynor contended that the public interest required 
"plac[ing] the responsibility for whatever injury [defective products] may 
cause upon the manufacturer."294 
286. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ill. 
1965). 
287. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968). 
288. Consider, for example, the judicial approval of new theories of causation. See 
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-38 (Cal. 1980) (substituting market share 
liability for the traditional requirement that plaintiffs establish that defendant more likely 
than not caused plaintiffs' injuries). 
289. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
290. The actual holding was that automobiles were within the category of imminently 
dangerous products for which privity of contract was not necessary to establish 
manufacturer liability. See id. at 1053. Its expansion of the imminently dangerous 
category promised to bring the substantial run of products liability cases within the 
exception to the privity rule. 
291. Id. ("[T]he presence of a known danger, attendant upon a known use, makes 
vigilance a duty."). 
292. 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944). 
293. Id. at 440-41. 
294. Id. at 441. 
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Almost twenty years later, Traynor wrote into law precisely this prin- 
ciple in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963),295 which held manu- 
facturers strictly liable for personal injuries caused by defective products 
on the theory that "such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries 
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that 
put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who 
are powerless to protect themselves."296 And in Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc. (1960),297 the Supreme Court of NewJersey signaled the judi- 
cial acceptance of another element of the management engineers' 
claim-that individuals were unable to grasp the nature of the risks posed 
by modern economic life. In the Henningsen court's view, individuals thus 
could not be allowed to contract away their right to recover for personal 
injuries under an implied warranty of merchantability.298 
This is not to say that the mid-century greats of the American law of 
torts-Fleming James, William Prosser, Roger Traynor, and others-are 
usefully thought of as having been ongoing participants in a campaign to 
establish and legitimate managerial control by private enterprise. Nor is 
it even to say that the mid-century torts decisions were somehow com- 
plicit in the construction of regimes of managerial control. To be sure, 
the earlier workmen's compensation statutes were importantly involved 
in the reconstruction of the firm around the managerial model. 
Jonathan Simon, for example, has described the disciplining effects that 
new liability rule incentives had on firms to systematize their managerial 
apparatus.299 Elsewhere, I have described what might be called the legiti- 
mation effects of workmen's compensation, which subtly inscribed into 
law a norm of managerial control even as it extended new benefits to 
wage earners.300 But by the time of the mid-century liability revolution, 
American firms had for the most part already been transformed along the 
lines that turn-of-the-twentieth-century engineers had envisioned. In- 
deed, in some respects the liability explosion represented the beginnings 
of a culture of suspicion and distrust toward the hierarchical institutions 
that had come by the 1950s and 1960s to dominate large swaths of Ameri- 
can life.301 
295. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
296. Id. at 901. 
297. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
298. Id. at 92-93. 
299. Jonathan Simon, For the Government of Its Servants: Law and Disciplinary 
Power in the Work Place, 1870-1906, 13 Stud. L. Pol. & Soc'y 105, 125-26 (1993). 
300. On this point, see John Fabian Witt, Rethinking the Nineteenth-Century 
Employment Contract, Again, 18 Law & Hist. Rev. 627, 645-46 & n.59 (2000); Witt, 
Transformation of Work, supra note 186, at 1484-86. 
301. Schuck, supra note 9, at 6-8. 
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VI. 
The expansion of tort liability that began in the middle of the twenti- 
eth century continued into the 1980s, though it seems to have abated in 
subsequent years. Needless to say, the new tort rules in products cases, 
among others, have caused considerable distress in today's management 
circles. Consider a recent commentary from the United States Chamber 
Institute for Legal Reform, an affiliate of the Chamber of Commerce: 
The United States' lawsuit-crazy civil justice system seems bent 
on wrecking our economy through excessive litigation and bur- 
dening the court system with thousands of frivolous lawsuits. 
The cost of the U.S. civil justice system is growing at four times 
the rate of our economy. The impact of this runaway system can 
be measured in businesses bankrupt, jobs lost, and shareholder 
value destroyed.302 
The Chamber of Commerce and other manufacturers' groups have 
waged a now two-decade old campaign in the name of "tort reform" to 
roll back the enterprise liability revolution.303 Taylor's old organization, 
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, even plays a role in such 
efforts as an "active member of the American Tort Reform Associa- 
tion."304 As I have suggested in this article, however, a deep irony per- 
vades managerial tort reform efforts, and nowhere more so than in the 
ASME, which finds in enterprise liability today ideas it helped to propa- 
gate a century ago. 
In the same years in which American managerial engineers were get- 
ting their campaign underway, Max Weber described the Anglo Ameri- 
can common law as deeply resistant to modernist systematization.305 In 
contrast to the codified rules and professional judges of continental legal 
systems, the common law represented a kind of irrational khadi justice, 
Weber contended, its judges and juries latter-day oracles.306 The reap- 
pearance in contemporary tort law of managerial engineers' ideas about 
managerial control in the workplace is emblematic of the resistance to 
systematic rationalization and reengineering that Weber identified in the 
institutions of the American legal system. Managers could succeed (at 
302. U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Been Sued Lately?, at http://www.litiga 
tionfairness.org/facts_sued.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
303. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 San 
Diego L. Rev. 13, 37-43 (1988). 
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least partially) in their campaign to control the firm, but control of the 
dispersed, often unaccountable decisionmakers in American tort law re- 
mained largely out of their reach. And so in the jurisdiction of judges 
and juries, the ideas that men such as Taylor had made popular were 
turned against the firms that had advocated them. If firms were properly 
responsible for the operations of the enterprise, the logic went, then they 
ought to be responsible for the injuries incident to those operations. 
Moreover, unlike workmen's compensation, which accompanied ex- 
panded notions of responsibility with sharp caps on damages awards, 
there have not generally been caps on damages in the common law 
courts in which tort decisions are made. In extraordinary cases, punitive 
damages might even be available.307 For scientific managers, enterprise 
responsibility would thus become a kind of Frankenstein's monster, an 
example of hyper-rationalization gone mad, haunting its creators in a 
new and (to them) hideous form.308 
The resistance of judges and juries to the rationalizing impulses of 
the scientific managers also offers a useful perspective on the well-docu- 
mented use of workmen's compensation by employers as early as the 
1930s to limit their accident litigation costs. A number of historians have 
identified cost reduction as a goal of the original enactment of work- 
men's compensation legislation in the 1910s.309 For the most part, espe- 
cially in important early jurisdictions, workmen's compensation statutes 
actually increased employers' post-injury costs.310 But by the 1930s, tort 
litigation had developed and liability rules had widened so as to make 
cost reduction through workmen's compensation a real attraction. His- 
torians David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, for example, have docu- 
mented the way in which business interests beginning in the early 1930s 
sought to have silicosis included within compensation regimes so as to 
contain the explosion of tort actions being brought by diseased workers, 
many of them employed in excavating New York City subway lines.311 
The unanticipated consequence story suggests a kind of comeuppance 
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heart."). That enterprise liability is a bane of today's managers is clear enough. Whether 
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American tort law is a more difficult question. As Merton's early essay pointed out, 
"undesired effects are not always undesirable effects." Merton, supra note 1, at 895. Views 
on this question can be found across the map. Compare, e.g., Priest, Current Insurance 
Crisis, supra note 13, at 1582-90 (criticizing broadly the modern expansion of enterprise 
liability), with Croley & Hanson, supra note 260, at 767-79 (supporting expansion of 
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Ohio St. LJ. 443, 452-61 (1987) (advocating raising number of tort claims). 
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for firms. In consumer markets, the enterprise responsibility rhetoric of 
workmen's compensation (even in the self serving version recounted by 
Rosner and Markowitz) became open ended products liability. And in 
the employment relation itself, plaintiffs' lawyers began to take advantage 
of the ability to bring third party tort actions against manufacturers of 
products used in the workplace. Indeed, by the late twentieth century it 
was estimated that sixty percent of all products liability actions were 
brought by plaintiffs injured while at work.312 Employers have no doubt 
footed much of the bill in the form of increased costs for machinery and 
other equipment. 
Weber famously envisioned the rationalization of modern social in- 
stitutions as an iron cage, imprisoning its subjects in ways they barely per- 
ceived.313 Merton and his fellow mid-twentieth-century students of unan- 
ticipated consequences reacted against the Weberian suggestion that 
bureaucratic rationalization might actually be achievable.314 Adminis- 
tered rationalization by the state, they contended, was impossible in light 
of the manifold complexities of modern civil society. Managerial engi- 
neers' encounter with enterprise liability suggests one way in which even 
the authors of one of twentieth-century America's great modernist, ratio- 
nalized institutions might themselves be caught in Weber's cage. All the 
more striking, enterprise liability stemmed from unanticipated conse- 
quences arising not out of the diffuse institutions of civil society, but out 
of the manifold complexities and indeed-on Weber's account-persis- 
tent irrationalities of the American common law. 
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313. See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 181 (Talcott 
Parsons trans., 1930) (1920). 
314. Weiss, supra note 5, at 243. 
2003] 49 
